Update 3.0 release notes with 3.0.15 security fixes
Mention 3.0.14 skipped.
Change-Id: Ia1b9b86e016c0d22ba9b50697a9c0f34436c1e7a
diff --git a/pages/site/releases/3.0.md b/pages/site/releases/3.0.md
index 54bde09..e5f6a8f 100644
--- a/pages/site/releases/3.0.md
+++ b/pages/site/releases/3.0.md
@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@
toc: true
---
-Download: **[3.0.13](https://gerrit-releases.storage.googleapis.com/gerrit-3.0.13.war)**
+Download: **[3.0.15](https://gerrit-releases.storage.googleapis.com/gerrit-3.0.15.war)**
+| [3.0.13](https://gerrit-releases.storage.googleapis.com/gerrit-3.0.13.war)
| [3.0.12](https://gerrit-releases.storage.googleapis.com/gerrit-3.0.12.war)
| [3.0.11](https://gerrit-releases.storage.googleapis.com/gerrit-3.0.11.war)
| [3.0.10](https://gerrit-releases.storage.googleapis.com/gerrit-3.0.10.war)
@@ -21,7 +22,8 @@
| [3.0.1](https://gerrit-releases.storage.googleapis.com/gerrit-3.0.1.war)
| [3.0.0](https://gerrit-releases.storage.googleapis.com/gerrit-3.0.0.war)
-Documentation: **[3.0.13](https://gerrit-documentation.storage.googleapis.com/Documentation/3.0.13/index.html)**
+Documentation: **[3.0.15](https://gerrit-documentation.storage.googleapis.com/Documentation/3.0.15/index.html)**
+| [3.0.13](https://gerrit-documentation.storage.googleapis.com/Documentation/3.0.13/index.html)
| [3.0.12](https://gerrit-documentation.storage.googleapis.com/Documentation/3.0.12/index.html)
| [3.0.11](https://gerrit-documentation.storage.googleapis.com/Documentation/3.0.11/index.html)
| [3.0.10](https://gerrit-documentation.storage.googleapis.com/Documentation/3.0.10/index.html)
@@ -212,6 +214,55 @@
## Bugfix Releases
+### 3.0.15
+
+* Security Fixes
+
+ * [Issue 13621](https://bugs.chromium.org/p/gerrit/issues/detail?id=13621):
+ Make `PermissionBackend#ForRef` authoritative.
+
+ Fixes a misconception that leads to data being accessible through Gerrit
+ APIs that should be locked down.
+
+ Gerrit had two components for determining if a Git ref is visible to a
+ user: `(Default)RefFilter` and `PermissionBackend#ForRef` (e.g.,
+ `RefControl`). The former was always capable of providing correct results
+ for all refs. The latter only had logic to decide if a Git ref is visible
+ according to the Gerrit `READ` permissions. This includes all refs under
+ `refs/heads` as well as any other ref that isn't a database ref or a Git
+ tag. This component was unaware of Git tags and notedb-related refs. Hence,
+ when asked for a database reference such as `refs/changes/xx/yyyyxx/meta`,
+ the logic would allow access if the user has `READ` permissions on any of
+ the ref prefixes (such as the default "read refs/* Anonymous Users").
+
+ That was problematic, because it bypassed
+ [documented behavior](http://gerrit-documentation.storage.googleapis.com/Documentation/3.0.15/access-control.html)
+ where a user should only have access to a change if he can see the
+ destination ref. The same goes for other database references.
+
+ * [Issue 13514](https://bugs.chromium.org/p/gerrit/issues/detail?id=13514):
+ Work around Gitiles bug on `All-Users` visibility.
+
+ Gitiles has a special `FilteredRepository` wrapper that allows carefully
+ hiding refs based on the project's ACLs. There is however an optimization
+ that skips the filtering in case a user has `READ` permissions on every ACL
+ pattern(s). When the target repository is `All-Users`, the optimization
+ turns into a security issue because it allows seeing all personal information
+ associated with all accounts, i.e.:
+
+ * draft comments
+ * draft edits
+ * personally identifiable information (PII) of all users
+ * external ids
+
+ This fix now blocks Gitiles or any other part of Gerrit to abuse this power
+ when the target repository is `All-Users`, where nobody can be authorized
+ to skip the ACLs evaluation anyway.
+
+### 3.0.14
+
+This minor release has been withdrawn.
+
### 3.0.13
* Breaking Changes
