Update 3.2 release notes with 3.2.5 security fixes
Mention 3.2.4 skipped.
Change-Id: I9f3ea55641c0242518d61d8143c68762a2b4d919
diff --git a/pages/site/releases/3.2.md b/pages/site/releases/3.2.md
index fc645c0..bfdba06 100644
--- a/pages/site/releases/3.2.md
+++ b/pages/site/releases/3.2.md
@@ -6,12 +6,14 @@
toc: true
---
-Download: **[3.2.3](https://gerrit-releases.storage.googleapis.com/gerrit-3.2.3.war)**
+Download: **[3.2.5](https://gerrit-releases.storage.googleapis.com/gerrit-3.2.5.war)**
+| [3.2.3](https://gerrit-releases.storage.googleapis.com/gerrit-3.2.3.war)
| [3.2.2](https://gerrit-releases.storage.googleapis.com/gerrit-3.2.2.war)
| [3.2.1](https://gerrit-releases.storage.googleapis.com/gerrit-3.2.1.war)
| [3.2.0](https://gerrit-releases.storage.googleapis.com/gerrit-3.2.0.war)
-Documentation: **[3.2.3](https://gerrit-documentation.storage.googleapis.com/Documentation/3.2.3/index.html)**
+Documentation: **[3.2.5](https://gerrit-documentation.storage.googleapis.com/Documentation/3.2.5/index.html)**
+| [3.2.3](https://gerrit-documentation.storage.googleapis.com/Documentation/3.2.3/index.html)
| [3.2.2](https://gerrit-documentation.storage.googleapis.com/Documentation/3.2.2/index.html)
| [3.2.1](https://gerrit-documentation.storage.googleapis.com/Documentation/3.2.1/index.html)
| [3.2.0](https://gerrit-documentation.storage.googleapis.com/Documentation/3.2.0/index.html)
@@ -594,7 +596,7 @@
## Bugfix Releases
-### 3.2.4 (in development)
+### 3.2.5
* Breaking Changes
@@ -611,13 +613,50 @@
* Security Fixes
-* Bug Fixes
+ * [Issue 13621](https://bugs.chromium.org/p/gerrit/issues/detail?id=13621):
+ Make `PermissionBackend#ForRef` authoritative.
-* PolyGerrit Fixes
+ Fixes a misconception that leads to data being accessible through Gerrit
+ APIs that should be locked down.
-* Documentation Updates
+ Gerrit had two components for determining if a Git ref is visible to a
+ user: `(Default)RefFilter` and `PermissionBackend#ForRef` (e.g.,
+ `RefControl`). The former was always capable of providing correct results
+ for all refs. The latter only had logic to decide if a Git ref is visible
+ according to the Gerrit `READ` permissions. This includes all refs under
+ `refs/heads` as well as any other ref that isn't a database ref or a Git
+ tag. This component was unaware of Git tags and notedb-related refs. Hence,
+ when asked for a database reference such as `refs/changes/xx/yyyyxx/meta`,
+ the logic would allow access if the user has `READ` permissions on any of
+ the ref prefixes (such as the default "read refs/* Anonymous Users").
-* Dependency Updates
+ That was problematic, because it bypassed
+ [documented behavior](http://gerrit-documentation.storage.googleapis.com/Documentation/3.2.5/access-control.html)
+ where a user should only have access to a change if he can see the
+ destination ref. The same goes for other database references.
+
+ * [Issue 13514](https://bugs.chromium.org/p/gerrit/issues/detail?id=13514):
+ Work around Gitiles bug on `All-Users` visibility.
+
+ Gitiles has a special `FilteredRepository` wrapper that allows carefully
+ hiding refs based on the project's ACLs. There is however an optimization
+ that skips the filtering in case a user has `READ` permissions on every ACL
+ pattern(s). When the target repository is `All-Users`, the optimization
+ turns into a security issue because it allows seeing all personal information
+ associated with all accounts, i.e.:
+
+ * draft comments
+ * draft edits
+ * personally identifiable information (PII) of all users
+ * external ids
+
+ This fix now blocks Gitiles or any other part of Gerrit to abuse this power
+ when the target repository is `All-Users`, where nobody can be authorized
+ to skip the ACLs evaluation anyway.
+
+### 3.2.4
+
+This minor release has been withdrawn.
### 3.2.3
