| :linkattrs: |
| = Gerrit Code Review - Access Controls |
| |
| Access controls in Gerrit are group based. Every user account is a |
| member of one or more groups, and access and privileges are granted |
| to those groups. Access rights cannot be granted to individual |
| users. |
| |
| To view/edit the access controls for a specific project, first |
| navigate to the projects page: for example, |
| https://gerrit-review.googlesource.com/admin/repos/[role=external,window=_blank]. Then click on |
| the individual project, and then click Access. This will bring you |
| to a url that looks like |
| https://gerrit-review.googlesource.com/admin/repos/gerrit,access[role=external,window=_blank] |
| |
| [[system_groups]] |
| == System Groups |
| |
| Gerrit comes with the following system groups: |
| |
| * Anonymous Users |
| * Change Owner |
| * Project Owners |
| * Registered Users |
| |
| The system groups are assigned special access and membership management |
| privileges. |
| |
| |
| [[anonymous_users]] |
| === Anonymous Users |
| |
| All users are automatically a member of this group. Users who are |
| not signed in are a member of only this group, and no others. |
| |
| Any access rights assigned to this group are inherited by all users. |
| |
| Administrators and project owners can grant access rights to this |
| group in order to permit anonymous users to view project changes, |
| without requiring sign in first. Currently it is only worthwhile |
| to grant `Read` access to this group as Gerrit requires an account |
| identity for all other operations. |
| |
| |
| [[project_owners]] |
| === Project Owners |
| |
| Access rights assigned to this group are always evaluated within the |
| context of a project to which the access rights apply. These rights |
| therefore apply to all the users who are owners of this project. |
| |
| By assigning access rights to this group on a parent project Gerrit |
| administrators can define a set of default access rights for |
| <<category_owner,project owners>>. Child projects inherit these |
| access rights where they are resolved to the users that own the child |
| project. Having default access rights for |
| <<category_owner,project owners>> assigned on a parent project may |
| avoid the need to initially configure access rights for |
| newly created child projects. |
| |
| |
| [[change_owner]] |
| === Change Owner |
| |
| Access rights assigned to this group are always evaluated within the |
| context of a change to which the access rights apply. These rights |
| therefore apply to the user who is the owner of this change. |
| |
| It is typical to assign a label to this group, allowing the change |
| owner to vote on his change, but not actually cause it to become |
| approved or rejected. |
| |
| [[registered_users]] |
| === Registered Users |
| |
| All signed-in users are automatically a member of this group (and |
| also <<anonymous_users,'Anonymous Users'>>, see above). |
| |
| Any access rights assigned to this group are inherited by all |
| users as soon as they sign-in to Gerrit. If OpenID authentication |
| is being employed, moving from only 'Anonymous Users' into this |
| group is very easy. Caution should be taken when assigning any |
| permissions to this group. |
| |
| It is typical to assign `Code-Review -1..+1` to this group, |
| allowing signed-in users to vote on a change, but not actually |
| cause it to become approved or rejected. |
| |
| Registered users are always permitted to make and publish comments |
| on any change in any project they have `Read` access to. |
| |
| |
| == Predefined Groups |
| |
| Predefined groups differs from system groups by the fact that they |
| exist in the ACCOUNT_GROUPS table (like normal groups) but predefined groups |
| are created on Gerrit site initialization and unique UUIDs are assigned |
| to those groups. These UUIDs are different on different Gerrit sites. |
| |
| Gerrit comes with two predefined groups: |
| |
| * Administrators |
| * Non-Interactive Users |
| |
| |
| [[administrators]] |
| === Administrators |
| |
| This is a predefined group, created on Gerrit site initialization, that |
| has the capability link:access-control.html#capability_administrateServer[ |
| 'Administrate Server'] assigned. |
| |
| It is a normal Gerrit group without magic. This means if you remove |
| the 'Administrate Server' capability from it, its members are no longer |
| Gerrit administrators, despite the group name. The group may also be |
| renamed. |
| |
| |
| [[non-interactive_users]] |
| === Non-Interactive Users |
| |
| This is the Gerrit "batch" identity. The capabilities |
| link:access-control.html#capability_priority['Priority BATCH'] and |
| link:access-control.html#capability_streamEvents['Stream Events'] |
| are assigned to this predefined group on Gerrit site creation. |
| |
| The members of this group are not expected to perform interactive |
| operations on the Gerrit web front-end. |
| |
| However, sometimes such a user may need a separate thread pool in |
| order to prevent it from grabbing threads from the interactive users. |
| |
| These users live in a second thread pool, which separates operations |
| made by the non-interactive users from the ones made by the interactive |
| users. This ensures that the interactive users can keep working when |
| resources are tight. |
| |
| |
| == Account Groups |
| |
| Account groups contain a list of zero or more user account members, |
| added individually by a group owner. Any user account listed as |
| a group member is given any access rights granted to the group. |
| |
| Every group has one other group designated as its owner. Users who |
| are members of the owner group can: |
| |
| * Add users and other groups to this group |
| * Remove users and other groups from this group |
| * Change the name of this group |
| * Change the description of this group |
| * Change the owner of this group, to another group |
| |
| It is permissible for a group to own itself, allowing the group |
| members to directly manage who their peers are. |
| |
| Newly created groups are automatically created as owning themselves, |
| with the creating user as the only member. This permits the group |
| creator to add additional members, and change the owner to another |
| group if desired. |
| |
| It is somewhat common to create two groups at the same time, |
| for example `Foo` and `Foo-admin`, where the latter group |
| `Foo-admin` owns both itself and also group `Foo`. Users who |
| are members of `Foo-admin` can thus control the membership of |
| `Foo`, without actually having the access rights granted to `Foo`. |
| This configuration can help prevent accidental submits when the |
| members of `Foo` have submit rights on a project, and the members of |
| `Foo-admin` typically do not need to have such rights. |
| |
| |
| [[ldap_groups]] |
| == LDAP Groups |
| |
| LDAP groups are Account Groups that are maintained inside of your |
| LDAP instance. If you are using LDAP to manage your groups they will |
| not appear in the Groups list. However you can use them just like |
| regular Account Groups by prefixing your group with "ldap/" in the |
| Access Control for a project. For example "ldap/foo-project" will |
| add the LDAP "foo-project" group to the access list. |
| |
| |
| == Project Access Control Lists |
| |
| A system wide access control list affecting all projects is stored in |
| project "`All-Projects`". This inheritance can be configured |
| through link:cmd-set-project-parent.html[gerrit set-project-parent]. |
| |
| When projects are set as parent projects, the child projects inherit |
| all of the parent's access rights. "`All-Projects`" is treated as a |
| parent of all projects. |
| |
| Per-project access control lists are also supported. |
| |
| Users are permitted to use the maximum range granted to any of their |
| groups on a label. For example, a user is a member of `Foo Leads`, and |
| the following ACLs are granted on a project: |
| |
| [options="header"] |
| |=================================================== |
| |Group |Reference Name |Label |Range |
| |Anonymous Users |refs/heads/* |Code-Review|-1..+1 |
| |Registered Users|refs/heads/* |Code-Review|-1..+2 |
| |Foo Leads |refs/heads/* |Code-Review|-2..0 |
| |=================================================== |
| |
| Then the effective range permitted to be used by the user is |
| `-2..+2`, as the user is a member of all three groups (see above |
| about the system groups) and the maximum range is chosen (so the |
| lowest value granted to any group, and the highest value granted |
| to any group). |
| |
| Reference-level access control is also possible. |
| |
| Permissions can be set on a single reference name to match one |
| branch (e.g. `refs/heads/master`), or on a reference namespace |
| (e.g. `+refs/heads/*+`) to match any branch starting with that |
| prefix. So a permission with `+refs/heads/*+` will match all of |
| `refs/heads/master`, `refs/heads/experimental`, `refs/heads/release/1.0` etc. |
| |
| Reference names can also be described with a regular expression |
| by prefixing the reference name with `^`. For example |
| `^refs/heads/[a-z]{1,8}` matches all lower case branch names |
| between 1 and 8 characters long. Within a regular expression `.` |
| is a wildcard matching any character, but may be escaped as `\.`. |
| The link:http://www.brics.dk/automaton/[dk.brics.automaton library,role=external,window=_blank] |
| is used for evaluation of regular expression access control |
| rules. See the library documentation for details on this |
| particular regular expression flavor. One quirk is that the |
| shortest possible pattern expansion must be a valid ref name: |
| thus `^refs/heads/.*/name` will fail because `refs/heads//name` |
| is not a valid reference, but `^refs/heads/.+/name` will work. |
| |
| [[sharded-user-id]] |
| References can have the user name or the sharded account ID of the |
| current user automatically included, creating dynamic access controls |
| that change to match the currently logged in user. For example to |
| provide a personal sandbox space to all developers, |
| `+refs/heads/sandbox/${username}/*+` allows the user 'joe' to use |
| 'refs/heads/sandbox/joe/foo'. The sharded account ID can be used to |
| give users access to their user branch in the `All-Users` repository, |
| for example `+refs/users/${shardeduserid}+` is resolved to |
| 'refs/users/23/1011123' if the account ID of the current user is |
| `1011123`. |
| |
| When evaluating a reference-level access right, Gerrit will use |
| the full set of access rights to determine if the user |
| is allowed to perform a given action. For example, if a user is a |
| member of `Foo Leads`, they are reviewing a change destined for |
| the `refs/heads/qa` branch, and the following ACLs are granted |
| on the project: |
| |
| [options="header"] |
| |=============================================================== |
| |Group |Reference Name|Label |Range |Exclusive |
| |Registered Users |refs/heads/* |Code-Review| -1..+1 | |
| |Foo Leads |refs/heads/* |Code-Review| -2..+2 | |
| |QA Leads |refs/heads/qa |Code-Review| -2..+2 | |
| |=============================================================== |
| |
| Then the effective range permitted to be used by the user is |
| `-2..+2`, as the user's membership of `Foo Leads` effectively grant |
| them access to the entire reference space, thanks to the wildcard. |
| |
| Gerrit also supports exclusive reference-level access control. |
| |
| It is possible to configure Gerrit to grant an exclusive ref level |
| access control so that only users of a specific group can perform |
| an operation on a project/reference pair. This is done by ticking |
| the exclusive flag when setting the permission for the |
| `refs/heads/qa` branch. |
| |
| For example, if a user who is a member of `Foo Leads` tries to |
| review a change destined for branch `refs/heads/qa` in a project, |
| and the following ACLs are granted: |
| |
| [options="header"] |
| |============================================================== |
| |Group |Reference Name|Label |Range |Exclusive |
| |Registered Users|refs/heads/* |Code-Review| -1..+1 | |
| |Foo Leads |refs/heads/* |Code-Review| -2..+2 | |
| |QA Leads |refs/heads/qa |Code-Review| -2..+2 |X |
| |============================================================== |
| |
| Then this user will not have `Code-Review` rights on that change, |
| since there is an exclusive access right in place for the |
| `refs/heads/qa` branch. This allows locking down access for a |
| particular branch to a limited set of users, bypassing inherited |
| rights and wildcards. |
| |
| In order to grant the ability to `Code-Review` to the members of |
| `Foo Leads`, in `refs/heads/qa` then the following access rights |
| would be needed: |
| |
| [options="header"] |
| |============================================================== |
| |Group |Reference Name|Category |Range |Exclusive |
| |Registered Users|refs/heads/* |Code-Review| -1..+1 | |
| |Foo Leads |refs/heads/* |Code-Review| -2..+2 | |
| |QA Leads |refs/heads/qa |Code-Review| -2..+2 |X |
| |Foo Leads |refs/heads/qa |Code-Review| -2..+2 | |
| |============================================================== |
| |
| |
| === OpenID Authentication |
| |
| If the Gerrit instance is configured to use OpenID authentication, |
| an account's effective group membership will be restricted to only |
| the `Anonymous Users` and `Registered Users` groups, unless *all* |
| of its OpenID identities match one or more of the patterns listed |
| in the `auth.trustedOpenID` list from `gerrit.config`. |
| |
| |
| === All Projects |
| |
| Any access right granted to a group within `All-Projects` |
| is automatically inherited by every other project in the same |
| Gerrit instance. These rights can be seen, but not modified, |
| in any other project's `Access` administration tab. |
| |
| Only members of the groups with the `Administrate Server` capability |
| may edit the access control list for `All-Projects`. By default this |
| capability is given to the group `Administrators`, but can be given |
| to more groups. |
| |
| Ownership of this project cannot be delegated to another group. |
| This restriction is by design. Granting ownership to another |
| group gives nearly the same level of access as membership in |
| `Administrators` does, as group members would be able to alter |
| permissions for every managed project including global capabilities. |
| |
| |
| === Per-Project |
| |
| The per-project ACL is evaluated before the global `All-Projects` ACL, |
| permitting some limited override capability to project owners. This |
| behavior is generally only useful on the `Read` category when |
| granting 'DENY' within a specific project to deny a group access. |
| |
| |
| [[references]] |
| == Special and magic references |
| |
| The reference namespaces used in git are generally two, one for branches and |
| one for tags: |
| |
| * +refs/heads/*+ |
| * +refs/tags/*+ |
| |
| However, every reference under +refs/*+ is really available, and in Gerrit this |
| opportunity for giving other refs a special meaning is used. In Gerrit they |
| are sometimes used as magic/virtual references that give the push to Gerrit a |
| special meaning. |
| |
| |
| [[references_special]] |
| === Special references |
| |
| The special references have content that's either generated by Gerrit or |
| contains important project configuration that Gerrit needs. When making |
| changes to these references, Gerrit will take extra precautions to verify the |
| contents compatibility at upload time. |
| |
| |
| ==== refs/changes/* |
| |
| Under this namespace each uploaded patch set for every change gets a static |
| reference in their git. The format is convenient but still intended to scale to |
| hundreds of thousands of patch sets. To access a given patch set you will |
| need the change number and patch set number. |
| |
| -- |
| 'refs/changes/'<last two digits of change number>/ |
| <change number>/ |
| <patch set number> |
| -- |
| |
| You can also find these static references linked on the page of each change. |
| |
| |
| ==== refs/meta/config |
| |
| This is where the Gerrit configuration of each project resides. This |
| branch contains several files of importance: +project.config+, +groups+ and |
| +rules.pl+. Together they control access and behavior during the change |
| review process. |
| |
| |
| ==== refs/meta/dashboards/* |
| |
| There's a dedicated page where you can read more about |
| link:user-dashboards.html[User Dashboards]. |
| |
| |
| ==== refs/notes/review |
| |
| Autogenerated copy of review notes for all changes in the git. Each log entry |
| on the refs/notes/review branch also references the patch set on which the |
| review is made. This functionality is provided by the review-notes plugin. |
| |
| |
| [[references_magic]] |
| === Magic references |
| |
| These are references with added functionality to them compared to a regular |
| git push operation. |
| |
| [[refs_for]] |
| ==== refs/for/<branch ref> |
| |
| Most prominent is the `refs/for/<branch ref>` reference which is the reference |
| upon which we build the code review intercept before submitting a commit to |
| the branch it's uploaded to. |
| |
| Further documentation on how to push can be found on the |
| link:user-upload.html#push_create[Upload changes] page. |
| |
| |
| [[access_categories]] |
| == Access Categories |
| |
| Gerrit has several permission categories that can be granted to groups |
| within projects, enabling functionality for that group's members. |
| |
| |
| [[category_abandon]] |
| === Abandon |
| |
| This category controls whether users are allowed to abandon changes |
| to projects in Gerrit. It can give permission to abandon a specific |
| change to a given ref. |
| |
| The uploader of a change, anyone granted the <<category_owner,`Owner`>> |
| permission at the ref or project level, and anyone granted the |
| <<capability_administrateServer,`Administrate Server`>> |
| permission can also Abandon changes. |
| |
| This also grants the permission to restore a change if the user also |
| has link:#category_push[push permission] on the change's destination |
| ref. |
| |
| |
| [[category_create]] |
| === Create Reference |
| |
| The create reference category controls whether it is possible to |
| create new references, branches or tags. This implies that the |
| reference must not already exist, it's not a destructive permission |
| in that you can't overwrite or remove any previously existing |
| references (and also discard any commits in the process). |
| |
| It's probably most common to either permit the creation of a single |
| branch in many gits (by granting permission on a parent project), or |
| to grant this permission to a name pattern of branches. |
| |
| This permission is often given in conjunction with regular push |
| branch permissions, allowing the holder of both to create new branches |
| as well as bypass review for new commits on that branch. |
| |
| To push lightweight (non-annotated) tags, grant |
| `Create Reference` for reference name `+refs/tags/*+`, as lightweight |
| tags are implemented just like branches in Git. To push a lightweight |
| tag on a new commit (commit not reachable from any branch/tag) grant |
| `Push` permission on `+refs/tags/*+` too. The `Push` permission on |
| `+refs/tags/*+` also allows fast-forwarding of lightweight tags. |
| |
| For example, to grant the possibility to create new branches under the |
| namespace `foo`, you have to grant this permission on |
| `+refs/heads/foo/*+` for the group that should have it. |
| Finally, if you plan to grant each user a personal namespace in |
| where they are free to create as many branches as they wish, you |
| should grant the create reference permission so it's possible |
| to create new branches. This is done by using the special |
| `${username}` keyword in the reference pattern, e.g. |
| `+refs/heads/sandbox/${username}/*+`. If you do, it's also recommended |
| you grant the users the push force permission to be able to clean up |
| stale branches. |
| |
| [[category_delete]] |
| === Delete Reference |
| |
| The delete reference category controls whether it is possible to delete |
| references, branches or tags. It doesn't allow any other update of |
| references. |
| |
| Deletion of references is also possible if `Push` with the force option |
| is granted, however that includes the permission to fast-forward and |
| force-update references to existing and new commits. Being able to push |
| references for new commits is bad if bypassing of code review must be |
| prevented. |
| |
| |
| [[category_forge_author]] |
| === Forge Author |
| |
| Normally Gerrit requires the author and the committer identity |
| lines in a Git commit object (or tagger line in an annotated tag) to |
| match one of the registered email addresses of the uploading user. |
| This permission allows users to bypass parts of that validation, which |
| may be necessary when mirroring changes from an upstream project. |
| |
| Permits the use of an unverified author line in commit objects. |
| This can be useful when applying patches received by email from |
| 3rd parties, when cherry-picking changes written by others across |
| branches, or when amending someone else's commit to fix up a minor |
| problem before submitting. |
| |
| By default this is granted to `Registered Users` in all projects, |
| but a site administrator may disable it if verified authorship |
| is required. |
| |
| |
| [[category_forge_committer]] |
| === Forge Committer |
| |
| Normally Gerrit requires the author and the committer identity |
| lines in a Git commit object (or tagger line in an annotated tag) to |
| match one of the registered email addresses of the uploading user. |
| This permission allows users to bypass parts of that validation, which |
| may be necessary when mirroring changes from an upstream project. |
| |
| Allows the use of an unverified committer line in commit objects, or an |
| unverified tagger line in annotated tag objects. Typically this is only |
| required when mirroring commits from an upstream project repository. |
| |
| |
| [[category_forge_server]] |
| === Forge Server |
| |
| Normally Gerrit requires the author and the committer identity |
| lines in a Git commit object (or tagger line in an annotated tag) to |
| match one of the registered email addresses of the uploading user. |
| This permission allows users to bypass parts of that validation, which |
| may be necessary when mirroring changes from an upstream project. |
| |
| Allows the use of the server's own name and email on the committer |
| line of a new commit object. This should only be necessary when force |
| pushing a commit history which has been rewritten by 'git filter-branch' |
| and that contains merge commits previously created by this Gerrit Code |
| Review server. |
| |
| |
| [[category_owner]] |
| === Owner |
| |
| The `Owner` category controls which groups can modify the project's |
| configuration. Users who are members of an owner group can: |
| |
| * Change the project description |
| * Grant/revoke any access rights, including `Owner` |
| |
| To get SSH branch access project owners must grant an access right to a group |
| they are a member of, just like for any other user. |
| |
| Ownership over a particular branch subspace may be delegated by |
| entering a branch pattern. To delegate control over all branches |
| that begin with `qa/` to the QA group, add `Owner` category |
| for reference `+refs/heads/qa/*+`. Members of the QA group can |
| further refine access, but only for references that begin with |
| `refs/heads/qa/`. See <<project_owners,project owners>> to find |
| out more about this role. |
| |
| For the `All-Projects` root project any `Owner` access right on |
| 'refs/*' is ignored since this permission would allow users to edit the |
| global capabilities, which is the same as being able to administrate |
| the Gerrit server (e.g. the user could assign the `Administrate Server` |
| capability to the own account). |
| |
| |
| [[category_push]] |
| === Push |
| |
| This category controls how users are allowed to upload new commits |
| to projects in Gerrit. It can either give permission to push |
| directly into a branch, bypassing any code review process |
| that would otherwise be used. Or it may give permission to upload |
| new changes for code review, this depends on which namespace the |
| permission is granted to. |
| |
| [[category_push_direct]] |
| ==== Direct Push |
| |
| Any existing branch can be fast-forwarded to a new commit. |
| Creation of new branches is controlled by the |
| link:access-control.html#category_create['Create Reference'] |
| category. Deletion of existing branches is rejected. This is the |
| safest mode as commits cannot be discarded. |
| |
| * Force option |
| + |
| Implies <<category_delete,Delete Reference>>. Since a force push is |
| effectively a delete immediately followed by a create, but performed |
| atomically on the server and logged, this option also permits forced |
| push updates to branches. Enabling this option allows existing commits |
| to be discarded from a project history. |
| |
| The push category is primarily useful for projects that only want to |
| take advantage of Gerrit's access control features and do not need |
| its code review functionality. Projects that need to require code |
| reviews should not grant this category. |
| |
| |
| [[category_push_review]] |
| ==== Upload To Code Review |
| |
| The `Push` access right granted on the namespace |
| `refs/for/refs/heads/BRANCH` permits the user to upload a non-merge |
| commit to the project's `refs/for/BRANCH` namespace, creating a new |
| change for code review. |
| |
| A user must be able to clone or fetch the project in order to create |
| a new commit on their local system, so in practice they must also |
| have the `Read` access granted to upload a change. |
| |
| For an open source, public Gerrit installation, it is common to grant |
| `Push` for `+refs/for/refs/heads/*+` to `Registered Users` in the |
| `All-Projects` ACL. For more private installations, its common to |
| grant `Push` for `+refs/for/refs/heads/*+` to all users of a project. |
| |
| * Force option |
| + |
| The force option has no function when granted to a branch in the |
| `+refs/for/refs/heads/*+` namespace. |
| |
| |
| [[category_add_patch_set]] |
| === Add Patch Set |
| |
| This category controls which users are allowed to upload new patch sets to |
| existing changes. Irrespective of this permission, change owners are always |
| allowed to upload new patch sets for their changes. This permission needs to be |
| set on `refs/for/*`. |
| |
| By default, this permission is granted to `Registered Users` on `refs/for/*`, |
| allowing all registered users to upload a new patch set to any change. Revoking |
| this permission (by granting it to no groups and setting the "Exclusive" flag) |
| will prevent users from uploading a patch set to a change they do not own. |
| |
| |
| [[category_push_merge]] |
| === Push Merge Commits |
| |
| The `Push Merge Commit` access right permits the user to upload merge |
| commits. It's an add-on to the <<category_push,Push>> access right, and |
| so it won't be sufficient with only `Push Merge Commit` granted for a |
| push to happen. Some projects wish to restrict merges to being created |
| by Gerrit. By granting `Push` without `Push Merge Commit`, the only |
| merges that enter the system will be those created by Gerrit. |
| |
| The reference name connected to a `Push Merge Commit` entry must always |
| be prefixed with `refs/for/`, for example `refs/for/refs/heads/BRANCH`. |
| This applies even for an entry that complements a `Push` entry for |
| `refs/heads/BRANCH` that allows direct pushes of non-merge commits, and |
| the intention of the `Push Merge Commit` entry is to allow direct pushes |
| of merge commits. |
| |
| |
| [[category_push_annotated]] |
| [[category_create_annotated]] |
| === Create Annotated Tag |
| |
| This category permits users to push an annotated tag object into the |
| project's repository. Typically this would be done with a command line |
| such as: |
| |
| ---- |
| git push ssh://USER@HOST:PORT/PROJECT tag v1.0 |
| ---- |
| |
| Or: |
| |
| ---- |
| git push https://HOST/PROJECT tag v1.0 |
| ---- |
| |
| Tags must be annotated (created with `git tag -a`), should exist in |
| the `refs/tags/` namespace, and should be new. |
| |
| This category is intended to be used to publish tags when a project |
| reaches a stable release point worth remembering in history. |
| |
| It allows for a new annotated (unsigned) tag to be created. The |
| tagger email address must be verified for the current user. |
| |
| To push tags created by users other than the current user (such |
| as tags mirrored from an upstream project), `Forge Committer Identity` |
| must be also granted in addition to `Create Annotated Tag`. |
| |
| To push lightweight (non annotated) tags, grant |
| <<category_create,`Create Reference`>> for reference name |
| `+refs/tags/*+`, as lightweight tags are implemented just like |
| branches in Git. |
| |
| To delete or overwrite an existing tag, grant `Push` with the force |
| option enabled for reference name `+refs/tags/*+`, as deleting a tag |
| requires the same permission as deleting a branch. |
| |
| To push an annotated tag on a new commit (commit not reachable from any |
| branch/tag) grant `Push` permission on `+refs/tags/*+` too. |
| The `Push` permission on `+refs/tags/*+` does *not* allow updating of annotated |
| tags, not even fast-forwarding of annotated tags. Update of annotated tags |
| is only allowed by granting `Push` with `force` option on `+refs/tags/*+`. |
| |
| |
| [[category_push_signed]] |
| [[category_create_signed]] |
| === Create Signed Tag |
| |
| This category permits users to push a PGP signed tag object into the |
| project's repository. Typically this would be done with a command |
| line such as: |
| |
| ---- |
| git push ssh://USER@HOST:PORT/PROJECT tag v1.0 |
| ---- |
| |
| Or: |
| |
| ---- |
| git push https://HOST/PROJECT tag v1.0 |
| ---- |
| |
| Tags must be signed (created with `git tag -s`), should exist in the |
| `refs/tags/` namespace, and should be new. |
| |
| |
| [[category_read]] |
| === Read |
| |
| The `Read` category controls visibility to the project's |
| changes, comments, code diffs, and Git access over SSH or HTTP. |
| A user must have this access granted in order to see a project, its |
| changes, or any of its data. |
| |
| [[read_special_behaviors]] |
| ==== Special behaviors |
| |
| This category has multiple special behaviors: |
| |
| The per-project ACL is evaluated before the global all projects ACL. |
| If the per-project ACL has granted `Read` with 'DENY', and does not |
| otherwise grant `Read` with 'ALLOW', then a `Read` in the all projects |
| ACL is ignored. This behavior is useful to hide a handful of projects |
| on an otherwise public server. |
| |
| You cannot grant `Read` on the `refs/tags/` namespace. Visibility to |
| `refs/tags/` is derived from `Read` grants on refs namespaces other than |
| `refs/tags/`, `refs/changes/`, and `refs/cache-automerge/` by finding |
| tags reachable from those refs. For example, if a tag `refs/tags/test` |
| points to a commit on the branch `refs/heads/master`, then allowing |
| `Read` access to `refs/heads/master` would also allow access to |
| `refs/tags/test`. If a tag is reachable from multiple refs, allowing |
| access to any of those refs allows access to the tag. |
| |
| [[read_typical_usage]] |
| ==== Typical usage |
| |
| For an open source, public Gerrit installation it is common to grant |
| `Read` to `Anonymous Users` in the `All-Projects` ACL, enabling |
| casual browsing of any project's changes, as well as fetching any |
| project's repository over SSH or HTTP. New projects can be |
| temporarily hidden from public view by granting `Read` with 'DENY' |
| to `Anonymous Users` and granting `Read` to the project owner's |
| group within the per-project ACL. |
| |
| For a private Gerrit installation using a trusted HTTP authentication |
| source, granting `Read` to `Registered Users` may be more |
| typical, enabling read access only to those users who have been |
| able to authenticate through the HTTP access controls. This may |
| be suitable in a corporate deployment if the HTTP access control |
| is already restricted to the correct set of users. |
| |
| |
| [[category_rebase]] |
| === Rebase |
| |
| This category permits users to rebase changes via the web UI by pushing |
| the `Rebase Change` button. |
| |
| The change owner and submitters can always rebase changes in the web UI |
| (even without having the `Rebase` access right assigned). |
| |
| Users without this access right who are able to upload new patch sets |
| can still do the rebase locally and upload the rebased commit as a new |
| patch set. |
| |
| [[category_revert]] |
| === Revert |
| |
| This category permits users to revert changes via the web UI by pushing |
| the `Revert Change` button. |
| |
| Users without this access right who are able to upload changes can |
| still do the revert locally and upload the revert commit as a new change. |
| |
| [[category_remove_reviewer]] |
| === Remove Reviewer |
| |
| This category permits users to remove other users from the list of |
| reviewers on a change. |
| |
| Change owners can always remove reviewers who have given a zero or positive |
| score (even without having the `Remove Reviewer` access right assigned). |
| |
| Project owners and site administrators can always remove any reviewer (even |
| without having the `Remove Reviewer` access right assigned). |
| |
| Users without this access right can only remove themselves from the |
| reviewer list on a change. |
| |
| |
| [[category_review_labels]] |
| === Review Labels |
| |
| For every configured label `My-Name` in the project, there is a |
| corresponding permission `label-My-Name` with a range corresponding to |
| the defined values. There is also a corresponding `labelAs-My-Name` |
| permission that enables editing another user's label. |
| |
| Gerrit comes pre-configured with a default 'Code-Review' label that can |
| be granted to groups within projects, enabling functionality for that |
| group's members. link:config-labels.html[Custom labels] may also be |
| defined globally or on a per-project basis. |
| |
| |
| [[category_submit]] |
| === Submit |
| |
| This category permits users to submit changes. |
| |
| Submitting a change causes it to be merged into the destination |
| branch as soon as possible, making it a permanent part of the |
| project's history. |
| |
| In order to submit, all labels (such as `Verified` and `Code-Review`, |
| above) must enable submit, and also must not block it. See above for |
| details on each label. |
| |
| To link:user-upload.html#auto_merge[immediately submit a change on push] |
| the caller needs to have the Submit permission on `refs/for/<ref>` |
| (e.g. on `refs/for/refs/heads/master`). |
| |
| Submitting to the `refs/meta/config` branch is only allowed to project |
| owners. Any explicit submit permissions for non-project-owners on this |
| branch are ignored. By submitting to the `refs/meta/config` branch the |
| configuration of the project is changed, which can include changes to |
| the access rights of the project. Allowing this to be done by a |
| non-project-owner would open a security hole enabling editing of access |
| rights, and thus granting of powers beyond submitting to the |
| configuration. |
| |
| [[category_submit_on_behalf_of]] |
| === Submit (On Behalf Of) |
| |
| This category permits users who have also been granted the `Submit` |
| permission to submit changes on behalf of another user, by using the |
| `on_behalf_of` field in link:rest-api-changes.html#submit-input[SubmitInput] |
| when link:rest-api-changes.html#submit-change[submitting using the REST API]. |
| |
| Note that this permission is named `submitAs` in the `project.config` |
| file. |
| |
| [[category_view_private_changes]] |
| === View Private Changes |
| |
| This category permits users to view all private changes and all change edit refs. |
| |
| The change owner and any explicitly added reviewers can always see |
| private changes (even without having the `View Private Changes` access |
| right assigned). |
| |
| |
| [[category_delete_own_changes]] |
| === Delete Own Changes |
| |
| This category permits users to delete their own changes if they are not merged |
| yet. This means only own changes that are open or abandoned can be deleted. |
| |
| [[category_delete_changes]] |
| === Delete Changes |
| |
| This category permits users to delete other users' changes if they are not merged |
| yet. This means only changes that are open or abandoned can be deleted. |
| |
| Having this permission implies having the link:#category_delete_own_changes[ |
| Delete Own Changes] permission. |
| |
| Administrators may always delete changes without having this permission. |
| |
| [[category_edit_topic_name]] |
| === Edit Topic Name |
| |
| This category permits users to edit the topic name of a change that |
| is uploaded for review. |
| |
| The change owner, branch owners, project owners, and site administrators |
| can always edit the topic name (even without having the `Edit Topic Name` |
| access right assigned). |
| |
| Whether the topic can be edited on closed changes can be controlled |
| by the 'Force Edit' flag. If this flag is not set the topic can only be |
| edited on open changes. |
| |
| |
| [[category_edit_hashtags]] |
| === Edit Hashtags |
| |
| This category permits users to add or remove |
| link:intro-user.html#hashtags[hashtags] on a change that is uploaded for review. |
| |
| The change owner, branch owners, project owners, and site administrators |
| can always edit or remove hashtags (even without having the `Edit Hashtags` |
| access right assigned). |
| |
| [[category_edit_assigned_to]] |
| === Edit Assignee |
| |
| This category permits users to set who is assigned to a change that is |
| uploaded for review. |
| |
| The change owner, ref owners, and the user currently assigned to a change |
| can always change the assignee. |
| |
| [[example_roles]] |
| == Examples of typical roles in a project |
| |
| Below follows a set of typical roles on a server and which access |
| rights these roles typically should be granted. You may see them as |
| general guidelines for a typical way to set up your project on a |
| brand new Gerrit instance. |
| |
| |
| [[examples_contributor]] |
| === Contributor |
| |
| This is the typical user on a public server. They are able to read |
| your project and upload new changes to it. They are able to give |
| feedback on other changes as well, but are unable to block or approve |
| any changes. |
| |
| Suggested access rights to grant: |
| |
| * xref:category_read[`Read`] on 'refs/heads/\*' |
| * xref:category_push[`Push`] to 'refs/for/refs/heads/*' |
| * link:config-labels.html#label_Code-Review[`Code-Review`] with range '-1' to '+1' for 'refs/heads/*' |
| |
| If it's desired to have the possibility to upload temporarily hidden |
| changes there's a specific permission for that. This enables someone |
| to add specific reviewers for early feedback before making the change |
| publicly visible. |
| |
| |
| [[examples_developer]] |
| === Developer |
| |
| This is the typical core developer on a public server. They are able |
| to read the project, upload changes to a branch. They are allowed to |
| push merge commits to merge branches together. Also, they are allowed |
| to forge author identity, thus handling commits belonging to others |
| than themselves, effectively allowing them to transfer commits |
| between different branches. |
| |
| They are furthermore able to code review and verify commits, and |
| eventually submit them. If you have an automated CI system that |
| builds all uploaded patch sets you might want to skip the |
| verification rights for the developer and let the CI system do that |
| exclusively. |
| |
| Suggested access rights to grant: |
| |
| * xref:category_read[`Read`] on 'refs/heads/\*' |
| * xref:category_push[`Push`] to 'refs/for/refs/heads/*' |
| * xref:category_push_merge[`Push merge commit`] to 'refs/for/refs/heads/*' |
| * xref:category_forge_author[`Forge Author Identity`] to 'refs/heads/*' |
| * link:config-labels.html#label_Code-Review[`Label: Code-Review`] with range '-2' to '+2' for 'refs/heads/*' |
| * link:config-labels.html#label_Verified[`Label: Verified`] with range '-1' to '+1' for 'refs/heads/*' |
| * xref:category_submit[`Submit`] on 'refs/heads/*' |
| |
| If the project is small or the developers are seasoned it might make |
| sense to give them the freedom to push commits directly to a branch. |
| |
| Optional access rights to grant: |
| |
| * <<category_push,`Push`>> to 'refs/heads/*' |
| * <<category_push_merge,`Push merge commit`>> to 'refs/heads/*' |
| |
| |
| [[examples_cisystem]] |
| === CI system |
| |
| A typical Continuous Integration system should be able to download new changes |
| to build and then leave a verdict somehow. |
| |
| As an example, the popular |
| link:https://wiki.jenkins-ci.org/display/JENKINS/Gerrit+Trigger[gerrit-trigger plugin,role=external,window=_blank] |
| for Jenkins/Hudson can set labels at: |
| |
| * The start of a build |
| * A successful build |
| * An unstable build (tests fails) |
| * A failed build |
| |
| Usually the range chosen for this verdict is the `Verified` label. Depending on |
| the size of your project and discipline of involved developers you might want |
| to limit access right to the +1 `Verified` label to the CI system only. That |
| way it's guaranteed that submitted commits always get built and pass tests |
| successfully. |
| |
| If the build doesn't complete successfully the CI system can set the |
| `Verified` label to -1. However that means that a failed build will block |
| submit of the change even if someone else sets `Verified` +1. Depending on the |
| project and how much the CI system can be trusted for accurate results, a |
| blocking label might not be feasible. A recommended alternative is to set the |
| label `Code-review` to -1 instead, as it isn't a blocking label but still |
| shows a red label in the Gerrit UI. Optionally, to enable the possibility to |
| deliver different results (build error vs unstable for instance), it's also |
| possible to set `Code-review` +1 as well. |
| |
| If pushing new changes is granted, it's possible to automate cherry-pick of |
| submitted changes for upload to other branches under certain conditions. This |
| is probably not the first step of what a project wants to automate however, |
| and so the push right can be found under the optional section. |
| |
| Suggested access rights to grant, that won't block changes: |
| |
| * xref:category_read[`Read`] on 'refs/heads/\*' |
| * link:config-labels.html#label_Code-Review[`Label: Code-Review`] with range '-1' to '0' for 'refs/heads/*' |
| * link:config-labels.html#label_Verified[`Label: Verified`] with range '0' to '+1' for 'refs/heads/*' |
| |
| Optional access rights to grant: |
| |
| * link:config-labels.html#label_Code-Review[`Label: Code-Review`] with range '-1' to '+1' for 'refs/heads/*' |
| * xref:category_push[`Push`] to 'refs/for/refs/heads/*' |
| |
| |
| [[examples_integrator]] |
| === Integrator |
| |
| Integrators are like developers but with some additional rights granted due |
| to their administrative role in a project. They can upload or push any commit |
| with any committer email (not just their own) and they can also create new |
| tags and branches. |
| |
| Suggested access rights to grant: |
| |
| * <<examples_developer,Developer rights>> |
| * <<category_push,`Push`>> to 'refs/heads/*' |
| * <<category_push_merge,`Push merge commit`>> to 'refs/heads/*' |
| * <<category_forge_committer,`Forge Committer Identity`>> to 'refs/for/refs/heads/*' |
| * <<category_create,`Create Reference`>> to 'refs/heads/*' |
| * <<category_create_annotated,`Create Annotated Tag`>> to 'refs/tags/*' |
| |
| |
| [[examples_project-owner]] |
| === Project owner |
| |
| The project owner is almost like an integrator but with additional destructive |
| power in the form of being able to delete branches. Optionally these users |
| also have the power to configure access rights in gits assigned to them. |
| |
| [WARNING] |
| These users should be really knowledgeable about git, for instance knowing why |
| tags never should be removed from a server. This role is granted potentially |
| destructive access rights and cleaning up after such a mishap could be time |
| consuming! |
| |
| Suggested access rights to grant: |
| |
| * <<examples_integrator,Integrator rights>> |
| * <<category_push,`Push`>> with the force option to 'refs/heads/\*' and 'refs/tags/*' |
| |
| Optional access right to grant: |
| |
| * <<category_owner,`Owner`>> in the gits they mostly work with. |
| |
| |
| [[examples_administrator]] |
| === Administrator |
| |
| The administrator role is the most powerful role known in the Gerrit universe. |
| This role may grant itself (or others) any access right. By default the |
| <<administrators,`Administrators` group>> is the group that has this role. |
| |
| Mandatory access rights: |
| |
| * <<capability_administrateServer,The `Administrate Server` capability>> |
| |
| Suggested access rights to grant: |
| |
| * <<examples_project-owner,`Project owner rights`>> |
| * Any <<global_capabilities,`capabilities`>> needed by the administrator |
| |
| |
| == Enforcing site wide access policies |
| |
| By granting the <<category_owner,`Owner`>> access right on the `+refs/*+` to a |
| group, Gerrit administrators can delegate the responsibility of maintaining |
| access rights for that project to that group. |
| |
| In a corporate deployment it is often necessary to enforce some access |
| policies. An example could be that no-one can update or delete a tag, not even |
| the project owners. The 'ALLOW' and 'DENY' rules are not enough for this |
| purpose as project owners can grant themselves any access right they wish and, |
| thus, effectively override any inherited access rights from the |
| "`All-Projects`" or some other common parent project. |
| |
| What is needed is a mechanism to block a permission in a parent project so |
| that even project owners cannot allow a blocked permission in their child |
| project. Still, project owners should retain the possibility to manage all |
| non-blocked rules as they wish. This gives best of both worlds: |
| |
| * Gerrit administrators can concentrate on enforcing site wide policies |
| and providing a meaningful set of default access permissions |
| * Project owners can manage access rights of their projects without a danger |
| of violating a site wide policy |
| |
| |
| [[block]] |
| === 'BLOCK' access rule |
| |
| The 'BLOCK' rule can be used to take away rights from users. The BLOCK rule |
| works across project inheritance, from the top down, so an administrator can |
| use 'BLOCK' rules to enforce site-wide restrictions. |
| |
| For example, if a user in the 'Foo Users' group tries to push to |
| 'refs/heads/mater' with the permissions below, that user will be blocked |
| |
| [options="header"] |
| |========================================================================= |
| |Project | Inherits From |Reference Name |Permissions | |
| |All-Projects | - |refs/* |push = block Foo Users | |
| |Foo | All-Projects |refs/heads/* |push = Foo Users | |
| |========================================================================= |
| |
| 'BLOCK' rules are evaluated starting from the parent project, and after a 'BLOCK' |
| rule is found to apply, further rules are ignored. Hence, in this example, the |
| permissions on child-project is ignored. |
| |
| ---- |
| All-Projects: project.config |
| [access "refs/heads/*"] |
| push = block group X |
| |
| child-project: project.config |
| [access "refs/heads/*"] |
| exclusiveGroupPermissions = push |
| push = group X |
| ---- |
| |
| In this case push for group 'X' will be blocked, even though the Exclusive |
| flag was set for the child-project. |
| |
| A 'BLOCK' rule that blocks the 'push' permission blocks any type of push, |
| force or not. A blocking force push rule blocks only force pushes, but |
| allows non-forced pushes if an 'ALLOW' rule would have permitted it. |
| |
| It is also possible to block label ranges. To block a group 'X' from voting |
| '-2' and '+2', but keep their existing voting permissions for the '-1..+1' |
| range intact we would define: |
| |
| ---- |
| [access "refs/heads/*"] |
| label-Code-Review = block -2..+2 group X |
| ---- |
| |
| The interpretation of the 'min..max' range in case of a blocking rule is: block |
| every vote from '-INFINITE..min' and 'max..INFINITE'. For the example above it |
| means that the range '-1..+1' is not affected by this block. |
| |
| === 'BLOCK' and 'ALLOW' rules in the same access section |
| |
| When an access section of a project contains a 'BLOCK' and an 'ALLOW' rule for |
| the same permission then this 'ALLOW' rule overrides the 'BLOCK' rule: |
| |
| ---- |
| [access "refs/heads/*"] |
| push = block group X |
| push = group Y |
| ---- |
| |
| In this case a user which is a member of the group 'Y' will still be allowed to |
| push to 'refs/heads/*' even if it is a member of the group 'X'. |
| |
| === 'BLOCK' and 'ALLOW' rules in the same project with the Exclusive flag |
| |
| When a project contains a 'BLOCK' and 'ALLOW' that uses the Exclusive flag in a |
| more specific reference, the 'ALLOW' rule with the Exclusive flag will override |
| the 'BLOCK' rule: |
| |
| ---- |
| [access "refs/*"] |
| read = block group X |
| |
| [access "refs/heads/*"] |
| exclusiveGroupPermissions = read |
| read = group X |
| ---- |
| |
| In this case a user which is a member of the group 'X' will still be allowed to |
| read 'refs/heads/*'. |
| |
| [NOTE] |
| An 'ALLOW' rule overrides a 'BLOCK' rule only when both of them are |
| inside the same access section of the same project. An 'ALLOW' rule in a |
| different access section of the same project or in any access section in an |
| inheriting project cannot override a 'BLOCK' rule. |
| |
| |
| === Examples |
| |
| The following examples show some possible use cases for the 'BLOCK' rules. |
| |
| ==== Make sure no one can update or delete a tag |
| |
| This requirement is quite common in a corporate deployment where |
| reproducibility of a build must be guaranteed. To achieve that we block 'push' |
| permission for the <<anonymous_users,'Anonymous Users'>> in "`All-Projects`": |
| |
| ---- |
| [access "refs/tags/*"] |
| push = block group Anonymous Users |
| ---- |
| |
| By blocking the <<anonymous_users,'Anonymous Users'>> we effectively block |
| everyone as everyone is a member of that group. Note that the permission to |
| create a tag is still necessary. Assuming that only <<category_owner,project |
| owners>> are allowed to create tags, we would extend the example above: |
| |
| ---- |
| [access "refs/tags/*"] |
| push = block group Anonymous Users |
| create = group Project Owners |
| pushTag = group Project Owners |
| ---- |
| |
| |
| ==== Let only a dedicated group vote in a special category |
| |
| Assume there is a more restrictive process for submitting changes in stable |
| release branches which is manifested as a new voting category |
| 'Release-Process'. Assume we want to make sure that only a 'Release Engineers' |
| group can vote in this category and that even project owners cannot approve |
| this category. We have to block everyone except the 'Release Engineers' to vote |
| in this category and, of course, allow 'Release Engineers' to vote in that |
| category. In the "`All-Projects`" we define the following rules: |
| |
| ---- |
| [access "refs/heads/stable*"] |
| label-Release-Process = block -1..+1 group Anonymous Users |
| label-Release-Process = -1..+1 group Release Engineers |
| ---- |
| |
| [[global_capabilities]] |
| == Global Capabilities |
| |
| The global capabilities control actions that the administrators of |
| the server can perform which usually affect the entire |
| server in some way. The administrators may delegate these |
| capabilities to trusted groups of users. |
| |
| Delegation of capabilities allows groups to be granted a subset of |
| administrative capabilities without being given complete |
| administrative control of the server. This makes it possible to |
| keep fewer users in the administrators group, even while spreading |
| much of the server administration burden out to more users. |
| |
| Global capabilities are assigned to groups in the access rights settings |
| of the root project ("`All-Projects`"). |
| |
| Below you find a list of capabilities available: |
| |
| |
| [[capability_accessDatabase]] |
| === Access Database |
| |
| Allow users to view code review metadata refs in repositories. |
| |
| |
| [[capability_administrateServer]] |
| === Administrate Server |
| |
| This is in effect the owner and administrator role of the Gerrit |
| instance. Any members of a group granted this capability will be |
| able to grant any access right to any group. They will also have all |
| capabilities granted to them automatically. |
| |
| In most installations only those users who have direct filesystem and |
| database access should be granted this capability. |
| |
| This capability does not imply any other access rights. Users that have |
| this capability do not automatically get code review approval or submit |
| rights in projects. This is a feature designed to permit administrative |
| users to otherwise access Gerrit as any other normal user would, |
| without needing two different accounts. |
| |
| |
| [[capability_batchChangesLimit]] |
| === Batch Changes Limit |
| |
| Allow site administrators to configure the batch changes limit for |
| users to override the system config |
| link:config-gerrit.html#receive.maxBatchChanges['receive.maxBatchChanges']. |
| |
| Administrators can add a global block to `All-Projects` with group(s) |
| that should have different limits. |
| |
| When applying a batch changes limit to a user the largest value |
| granted by any of their groups is used. 0 means no limit. |
| |
| |
| [[capability_createAccount]] |
| === Create Account |
| |
| Allow link:cmd-create-account.html[account creation over the ssh prompt]. |
| This capability allows the granted group members to create non-interactive |
| service accounts. These service accounts are generally used for automation |
| and made to be members of the |
| link:access-control.html#non-interactive_users['Non-Interactive users'] group. |
| |
| |
| [[capability_createGroup]] |
| === Create Group |
| |
| Allow group creation. Groups are used to grant users access to different |
| actions in projects. This capability allows the granted group members to |
| either link:cmd-create-group.html[create new groups via ssh] or via the web UI |
| by navigating at the top of the page to BROWSE -> Groups, and then pushing the |
| "CREATE NEW" button. |
| |
| |
| [[capability_createProject]] |
| === Create Project |
| |
| Allow project creation. This capability allows the granted group to |
| either link:cmd-create-project.html[create new git projects via ssh] |
| or via the web UI. |
| |
| |
| [[capability_emailReviewers]] |
| === Email Reviewers |
| |
| Allow or deny sending email to change reviewers and watchers. This can be used |
| to deny build bots from emailing reviewers and people who watch the change. |
| Instead, only the authors of the change and those who starred it will be |
| emailed. The allow rules are evaluated before deny rules, however the default |
| is to allow emailing, if no explicit rule is matched. |
| |
| |
| [[capability_flushCaches]] |
| === Flush Caches |
| |
| Allow the flushing of Gerrit's caches. This capability allows the granted |
| group to link:cmd-flush-caches.html[flush some or all Gerrit caches via ssh]. |
| |
| [NOTE] |
| This capability doesn't imply permissions to the show-caches command. For that |
| you need the <<capability_viewCaches,view caches capability>>. |
| |
| |
| [[capability_kill]] |
| === Kill Task |
| |
| Allow the operation of the link:cmd-kill.html[kill command over ssh]. The |
| kill command ends tasks that currently occupy the Gerrit server, usually |
| a replication task or a user initiated task such as an upload-pack or |
| receive-pack. |
| |
| [[capability_maintainServer]] |
| === Maintain Server |
| |
| Allow basic, constrained server maintenance tasks, such as flushing caches and |
| reindexing changes. Does not grant arbitrary database access, read/write, or |
| ACL management permissions, as might the |
| <<capability_administrateServer,administrate server capability>>. |
| |
| Implies the following capabilities: |
| |
| * <<capability_flushCaches,Flush Caches>> |
| * <<capability_kill,Kill Task>> |
| * <<capability_runGC,Run Garbage Collection>> |
| * <<capability_viewCaches,View Caches>> |
| * <<capability_viewQueue,View Queue>> |
| |
| [[capability_modifyAccount]] |
| === Modify Account |
| |
| Allow to link:cmd-set-account.html[modify accounts over the ssh prompt]. |
| This capability allows the granted group members to modify any user account |
| setting. In addition this capability is required to view secondary emails |
| of other accounts. |
| |
| [[capability_priority]] |
| === Priority |
| |
| This capability allows users to use |
| link:config-gerrit.html#sshd.batchThreads[the thread pool reserved] for |
| link:access-control.html#non-interactive_users['Non-Interactive Users']. |
| It's a binary value in that granted users either have access to the thread |
| pool, or they don't. |
| |
| There are three modes for this capability and they're listed by rising |
| priority: |
| |
| No capability configured.:: |
| The user isn't a member of a group with any priority capability granted. By |
| default the user is then in the 'INTERACTIVE' thread pool. |
| |
| 'BATCH':: |
| If there's a thread pool configured for 'Non-Interactive Users' and a user is |
| granted the priority capability with the 'BATCH' mode selected, the user ends |
| up in the separate batch user thread pool. This is true unless the user is |
| also granted the below 'INTERACTIVE' option. |
| |
| 'INTERACTIVE':: |
| If a user is granted the priority capability with the 'INTERACTIVE' option, |
| regardless if they also have the 'BATCH' option or not, they are in the |
| 'INTERACTIVE' thread pool. |
| |
| |
| [[capability_queryLimit]] |
| === Query Limit |
| |
| Allow site administrators to configure the query limit for users to |
| be above the default hard-coded value of 500. Administrators can add |
| a global block to `All-Projects` with group(s) that should have different |
| limits. |
| |
| When applying a query limit to a user the largest value granted by |
| any of their groups is used. |
| |
| This limit applies not only to the link:cmd-query.html[`gerrit query`] |
| command, but also to the web UI results pagination size. |
| |
| |
| [[capability_readAs]] |
| === Read As |
| |
| Allow users to impersonate any user to see which refs they can read. |
| |
| |
| [[capability_runAs]] |
| === Run As |
| |
| Allow users to impersonate any other user with the `X-Gerrit-RunAs` |
| HTTP header on REST API calls, or the link:cmd-suexec.html[suexec] |
| SSH command. |
| |
| When impersonating an administrator the Administrate Server capability |
| is not honored. This security feature tries to prevent a role with |
| Run As capability from modifying the access controls in All-Projects, |
| however modification may still be possible if the impersonated user |
| has permission to push or submit changes on `refs/meta/config`. Run |
| As also blocks using most capabilities including Create User, Run |
| Garbage Collection, etc., unless the capability is also explicitly |
| granted to a group the administrator is a member of. |
| |
| Administrators do not automatically inherit this capability; it must |
| be explicitly granted. |
| |
| |
| [[capability_runGC]] |
| === Run Garbage Collection |
| |
| Allow users to run the Git garbage collection for the repositories of |
| all projects. |
| |
| |
| [[capability_streamEvents]] |
| === Stream Events |
| |
| Allow performing streaming of Gerrit events. This capability |
| allows the granted group to |
| link:cmd-stream-events.html[stream Gerrit events via ssh]. |
| |
| |
| [[capability_viewAccess]] |
| === View Access |
| |
| Allow checking access rights for arbitrary (user, project) pairs, |
| using the link:rest-api-projects.html#check-access[check.access] |
| endpoint |
| |
| [[capability_viewAllAccounts]] |
| === View All Accounts |
| |
| Allow viewing all accounts for purposes of auto-completion, regardless |
| of link:config-gerrit.html#accounts.visibility[accounts.visibility] |
| setting. |
| |
| This capability allows to view all accounts but not all account data. |
| E.g. secondary emails of all accounts can only be viewed with the |
| link:#capability_modifyAccount[Modify Account] capability. |
| |
| |
| [[capability_viewCaches]] |
| === View Caches |
| |
| Allow querying for status of Gerrit's internal caches. This capability allows |
| the granted group to |
| link:cmd-show-caches.html[look at some or all Gerrit caches via ssh]. |
| |
| |
| [[capability_viewConnections]] |
| === View Connections |
| |
| Allow querying for status of Gerrit's current client connections. This |
| capability allows the granted group to |
| link:cmd-show-connections.html[look at Gerrit's current connections via ssh]. |
| |
| |
| [[capability_viewPlugins]] |
| === View Plugins |
| |
| Allow viewing the list of installed plugins. |
| |
| |
| [[capability_viewQueue]] |
| === View Queue |
| |
| Allow querying for status of Gerrit's internal task queue. This capability |
| allows the granted group to |
| link:cmd-show-queue.html[look at the Gerrit task queue via ssh]. |
| |
| |
| [[reference]] |
| == Permission evaluation reference |
| |
| Permission evaluation is expressed in the following concepts: |
| |
| * PermisssionRule: a single combination of {ALLOW, DENY, BLOCK} and |
| group, and optionally a vote range and an 'exclusive' bit. |
| |
| * Permission: groups PermissionRule by permission name. All |
| PermissionRules for same access type (eg. "read", "push") are grouped |
| into a Permission implicitly. The exclusive bit lives here. |
| |
| * AccessSection: ties a list of Permissions to a single ref pattern. |
| Each AccessSection comes from a single project. |
| |
| |
| |
| Here is how these play out in a link:config-project-config.html[project.config] file: |
| |
| ---- |
| # An AccessSection |
| [access "refs/heads/stable/*"] |
| exclusiveGroupPermissions = create |
| |
| # Each of the following lines corresponds to a PermissionRule |
| # The next two PermissionRule together form the "read" Permission |
| read = group Administrators |
| read = group Registered Users |
| |
| # A Permission with a block and block-override |
| create = block group Registered Users |
| create = group Project Owners |
| |
| # A Permission and PermissionRule for a label |
| label-Code-Review = -2..+2 group Project Owners |
| ---- |
| |
| === Ref permissions |
| |
| Access to refs can be blocked, allowed or denied. |
| |
| ==== BLOCK |
| |
| For blocking access, all rules marked BLOCK are tested, and if one |
| such rule matches, the user is denied access. |
| |
| The rules are ordered by inheritance, starting from All-Projects down. |
| Within a project, more specific ref patterns come first. The downward |
| ordering lets administrators enforce access rules across all projects |
| in a site. |
| |
| BLOCK rules can have exceptions defined on the same project (eg. BLOCK |
| anonymous users, ie. everyone, but make an exception for Admin users), |
| either by: |
| |
| 1. adding ALLOW PermissionRules in the same Permission. This implies |
| they apply to the same ref pattern. |
| |
| 2. adding an ALLOW Permission in the same project with a more specific |
| ref pattern, but marked "exclusive". This allows them to apply to |
| different ref patterns. |
| |
| Such additions not only bypass BLOCK rules, but they will also grant |
| permissions when they are processed in the ALLOW/DENY processing, as |
| described in the next subsection. |
| |
| ==== ALLOW |
| |
| For allowing access, all ALLOW/DENY rules that might apply to a ref |
| are tested until one granting access is found, or until either an |
| "exclusive" rule ends the search, or all rules have been tested. |
| |
| The rules are ordered from specific ref patterns to general patterns, |
| and for equally specific patterns, from originating project up to |
| All-Projects. |
| |
| This ordering lets project owners apply permissions specific to their |
| project, overwriting the site defaults specified in All-Projects. |
| |
| ==== DENY |
| |
| DENY is processed together with ALLOW. |
| |
| As said, during ALLOW/DENY processing, rules are tried out one by one. |
| For each (permission, ref-pattern, group) only a single rule |
| ALLOW/DENY rule is picked. If that first rule is a DENY rule, any |
| following ALLOW rules for the same (permission, ref-pattern, group) |
| will be ignored, canceling out their effect. |
| |
| DENY is confusing because it only works on a specific (ref-pattern, |
| group) pair. The parent project can undo the effect of a DENY rule by |
| introducing an extra rule which features a more general ref pattern or |
| a different group. |
| |
| ==== DENY/ALLOW example |
| |
| Consider the ref "refs/a" and the following configuration: |
| ---- |
| |
| child-project: project.config |
| [access "refs/a"] |
| read = deny group A |
| |
| All-Projects: project.config |
| [access "refs/a"] |
| read = group A # ALLOW |
| [access "refs/*"] |
| read = group B # ALLOW |
| ---- |
| |
| When determining access, first "read = DENY group A" on "refs/a" is |
| encountered. The following rule to consider is "ALLOW read group A" on |
| "refs/a". The latter rule applies to the same (permission, |
| ref-pattern, group) tuple, so it it is ignored. |
| |
| The DENY rule does not affect the last rule for "refs/*", since that |
| has a different ref pattern and a different group. If group B is a |
| superset of group A, the last rule will still grant group A access to |
| "refs/a". |
| |
| |
| ==== Double use of exclusive |
| |
| An 'exclusive' permission is evaluated both during BLOCK processing |
| and during ALLOW/DENY: when looking BLOCK, 'exclusive' stops the |
| search downward, while the same permission in the ALLOW/DENY |
| processing will stop looking upward for further rule matches |
| |
| ==== Force permission |
| |
| The 'force' setting may be set on ALLOW and BLOCK rules. In the case |
| of ALLOW, the 'force' option makes the permission stronger (allowing |
| both forced and unforced actions). For BLOCK, the 'force' option makes |
| it weaker (the BLOCK with 'force' only blocks forced actions). |
| |
| |
| === Labels |
| |
| Labels use the same mechanism, with the following observations: |
| |
| * The 'force' setting has no effect on label ranges. |
| |
| * BLOCK specifies the values that a group cannot vote, eg. |
| + |
| ---- |
| label-Code-Review = block -2..+2 group Anonymous Users |
| ---- |
| + |
| prevents all users from voting -2 or +2. |
| |
| * DENY works for votes too, with the same caveats |
| |
| * The blocked vote range is the union of the all the blocked vote |
| ranges across projects, so in |
| + |
| ---- |
| All-Projects: project.config |
| label-Code-Review = block -2..+1 group A |
| |
| Child-Project: project-config |
| label-Code-Review = block -1..+2 group A |
| ---- |
| + |
| members of group A cannot vote at all in the Child-Project. |
| |
| |
| * The allowed vote range is the union of vote ranges allowed by all of |
| the ALLOW rules. For example, in |
| + |
| ---- |
| label-Code-Review = -2..+1 group A |
| label-Code-Review = -1..+2 group B |
| ---- |
| + |
| a user that is both in A and B can vote -2..2. |
| |
| |
| GERRIT |
| ------ |
| Part of link:index.html[Gerrit Code Review] |
| |
| SEARCHBOX |
| --------- |