gerrit-gpg/src/main/java/com/google/gerrit/gpg/PublicKeyChecker.java - gerrit - Git at Google

 // Copyright (C) 2015 The Android Open Source Project
 //
 // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
 // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
 // You may obtain a copy of the License at
 //
 // http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
 //
 // Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
 // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
 // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
 // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 // limitations under the License.

 package com.google.gerrit.gpg;

 import static com.google.gerrit.extensions.common.GpgKeyInfo.Status.BAD;
 import static com.google.gerrit.extensions.common.GpgKeyInfo.Status.OK;
 import static com.google.gerrit.extensions.common.GpgKeyInfo.Status.TRUSTED;
 import static com.google.gerrit.gpg.PublicKeyStore.keyIdToString;
 import static com.google.gerrit.gpg.PublicKeyStore.keyToString;
 import static org.bouncycastle.bcpg.SignatureSubpacketTags.REVOCATION_KEY;
 import static org.bouncycastle.bcpg.SignatureSubpacketTags.REVOCATION_REASON;
 import static org.bouncycastle.bcpg.sig.RevocationReasonTags.KEY_COMPROMISED;
 import static org.bouncycastle.bcpg.sig.RevocationReasonTags.KEY_RETIRED;
 import static org.bouncycastle.bcpg.sig.RevocationReasonTags.KEY_SUPERSEDED;
 import static org.bouncycastle.bcpg.sig.RevocationReasonTags.NO_REASON;
 import static org.bouncycastle.openpgp.PGPSignature.DIRECT_KEY;
 import static org.bouncycastle.openpgp.PGPSignature.KEY_REVOCATION;

 import com.google.gerrit.extensions.common.GpgKeyInfo.Status;
 import java.io.IOException;
 import java.util.ArrayList;
 import java.util.Arrays;
 import java.util.Date;
 import java.util.HashMap;
 import java.util.HashSet;
 import java.util.Iterator;
 import java.util.List;
 import java.util.Map;
 import java.util.Set;
 import org.bouncycastle.bcpg.SignatureSubpacket;
 import org.bouncycastle.bcpg.SignatureSubpacketTags;
 import org.bouncycastle.bcpg.sig.RevocationKey;
 import org.bouncycastle.bcpg.sig.RevocationReason;
 import org.bouncycastle.openpgp.PGPException;
 import org.bouncycastle.openpgp.PGPPublicKey;
 import org.bouncycastle.openpgp.PGPPublicKeyRing;
 import org.bouncycastle.openpgp.PGPPublicKeyRingCollection;
 import org.bouncycastle.openpgp.PGPSignature;
 import org.bouncycastle.openpgp.operator.bc.BcPGPContentVerifierBuilderProvider;
 import org.slf4j.Logger;
 import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;

 /** Checker for GPG public keys for use in a push certificate. */
 public class PublicKeyChecker {
   private static final Logger log = LoggerFactory.getLogger(PublicKeyChecker.class);

   // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.2.3.13
   private static final int COMPLETE_TRUST = 120;

   private PublicKeyStore store;
   private Map<Long, Fingerprint> trusted;
   private int maxTrustDepth;
   private Date effectiveTime = new Date();

   /**
    * Enable web-of-trust checks.
    *
    * <p>If enabled, a store must be set with {@link #setStore(PublicKeyStore)}. (These methods are
    * separate since the store is a closeable resource that may not be available when reading trusted
    * keys from a config.)
    *
    * @param maxTrustDepth maximum depth to search while looking for a trusted key.
    * @param trusted ultimately trusted key fingerprints, keyed by fingerprint; may not be empty. To
    *     construct a map, see {@link Fingerprint#byId(Iterable)}.
    * @return a reference to this object.
    */
   public PublicKeyChecker enableTrust(int maxTrustDepth, Map<Long, Fingerprint> trusted) {
     if (maxTrustDepth <= 0) {
       throw new IllegalArgumentException("maxTrustDepth must be positive, got: " + maxTrustDepth);
     }
     if (trusted == null || trusted.isEmpty()) {
       throw new IllegalArgumentException("at least one trusted key is required");
     }
     this.maxTrustDepth = maxTrustDepth;
     this.trusted = trusted;
     return this;
   }

   /** Disable web-of-trust checks. */
   public PublicKeyChecker disableTrust() {
     trusted = null;
     return this;
   }

   /** Set the public key store for reading keys referenced in signatures. */
   public PublicKeyChecker setStore(PublicKeyStore store) {
     if (store == null) {
       throw new IllegalArgumentException("PublicKeyStore is required");
     }
     this.store = store;
     return this;
   }

   /**
    * Set the effective time for checking the key.
    *
    * <p>If set, check whether the key should be considered valid (e.g. unexpired) as of this time.
    *
    * @param effectiveTime effective time.
    * @return a reference to this object.
    */
   public PublicKeyChecker setEffectiveTime(Date effectiveTime) {
     this.effectiveTime = effectiveTime;
     return this;
   }

   protected Date getEffectiveTime() {
     return effectiveTime;
   }

   /**
    * Check a public key.
    *
    * @param key the public key.
    * @return the result of the check.
    */
   public final CheckResult check(PGPPublicKey key) {
     if (store == null) {
       throw new IllegalStateException("PublicKeyStore is required");
     }
     return check(key, 0, true, trusted != null ? new HashSet<Fingerprint>() : null);
   }

   /**
    * Perform custom checks.
    *
    * <p>Default implementation reports no problems, but may be overridden by subclasses.
    *
    * @param key the public key.
    * @param depth the depth from the initial key passed to {@link #check( PGPPublicKey)}: 0 if this
    *     was the initial key, up to a maximum of {@code maxTrustDepth}.
    * @return the result of the custom check.
    */
   public CheckResult checkCustom(PGPPublicKey key, int depth) {
     return CheckResult.ok();
   }

   private CheckResult check(PGPPublicKey key, int depth, boolean expand, Set<Fingerprint> seen) {
     CheckResult basicResult = checkBasic(key, effectiveTime);
     CheckResult customResult = checkCustom(key, depth);
     CheckResult trustResult = checkWebOfTrust(key, store, depth, seen);
     if (!expand && !trustResult.isTrusted()) {
       trustResult = CheckResult.create(trustResult.getStatus(), "Key is not trusted");
     }

     List<String> problems =
         new ArrayList<>(
             basicResult.getProblems().size()
                 + customResult.getProblems().size()
                 + trustResult.getProblems().size());
     problems.addAll(basicResult.getProblems());
     problems.addAll(customResult.getProblems());
     problems.addAll(trustResult.getProblems());

     Status status;
     if (basicResult.getStatus() == BAD
         || customResult.getStatus() == BAD
         || trustResult.getStatus() == BAD) {
       // Any BAD result and the final result is BAD.
       status = BAD;
     } else if (trustResult.getStatus() == TRUSTED) {
       // basicResult is BAD or OK, whereas trustResult is BAD or TRUSTED. If
       // TRUSTED, we trust the final result.
       status = TRUSTED;
     } else {
       // All results were OK or better, but trustResult was not TRUSTED. Don't
       // let subclasses bypass checkWebOfTrust by returning TRUSTED; just return
       // OK here.
       status = OK;
     }
     return CheckResult.create(status, problems);
   }

   private CheckResult checkBasic(PGPPublicKey key, Date now) {
     List<String> problems = new ArrayList<>(2);
     gatherRevocationProblems(key, now, problems);

     long validMs = key.getValidSeconds() * 1000;
     if (validMs != 0) {
       long msSinceCreation = now.getTime() - key.getCreationTime().getTime();
       if (msSinceCreation > validMs) {
         problems.add("Key is expired");
       }
     }
     return CheckResult.create(problems);
   }

   private void gatherRevocationProblems(PGPPublicKey key, Date now, List<String> problems) {
     try {
       List<PGPSignature> revocations = new ArrayList<>();
       Map<Long, RevocationKey> revokers = new HashMap<>();
       PGPSignature selfRevocation = scanRevocations(key, now, revocations, revokers);
       if (selfRevocation != null) {
         RevocationReason reason = getRevocationReason(selfRevocation);
         if (isRevocationValid(selfRevocation, reason, now)) {
           problems.add(reasonToString(reason));
         }
       } else {
         checkRevocations(key, revocations, revokers, problems);
       }
     } catch (PGPException | IOException e) {
       problems.add("Error checking key revocation");
     }
   }

   private static boolean isRevocationValid(
       PGPSignature revocation, RevocationReason reason, Date now) {
     // RFC4880 states:
     // "If a key has been revoked because of a compromise, all signatures
     // created by that key are suspect. However, if it was merely superseded or
     // retired, old signatures are still valid."
     //
     // Note that GnuPG does not implement this correctly, as it does not
     // consider the revocation reason and timestamp when checking whether a
     // signature (data or certification) is valid.
     return reason.getRevocationReason() == KEY_COMPROMISED
         || revocation.getCreationTime().before(now);
   }

   private PGPSignature scanRevocations(
       PGPPublicKey key, Date now, List<PGPSignature> revocations, Map<Long, RevocationKey> revokers)
       throws PGPException {
     @SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
     Iterator<PGPSignature> allSigs = key.getSignatures();
     while (allSigs.hasNext()) {
       PGPSignature sig = allSigs.next();
       switch (sig.getSignatureType()) {
         case KEY_REVOCATION:
           if (sig.getKeyID() == key.getKeyID()) {
             sig.init(new BcPGPContentVerifierBuilderProvider(), key);
             if (sig.verifyCertification(key)) {
               return sig;
             }
           } else {
             RevocationReason reason = getRevocationReason(sig);
             if (reason != null && isRevocationValid(sig, reason, now)) {
               revocations.add(sig);
             }
           }
           break;
         case DIRECT_KEY:
           RevocationKey r = getRevocationKey(key, sig);
           if (r != null) {
             revokers.put(Fingerprint.getId(r.getFingerprint()), r);
           }
           break;
       }
     }
     return null;
   }

   private RevocationKey getRevocationKey(PGPPublicKey key, PGPSignature sig) throws PGPException {
     if (sig.getKeyID() != key.getKeyID()) {
       return null;
     }
     SignatureSubpacket sub = sig.getHashedSubPackets().getSubpacket(REVOCATION_KEY);
     if (sub == null) {
       return null;
     }
     sig.init(new BcPGPContentVerifierBuilderProvider(), key);
     if (!sig.verifyCertification(key)) {
       return null;
     }

     return new RevocationKey(sub.isCritical(), sub.isLongLength(), sub.getData());
   }

   private void checkRevocations(
       PGPPublicKey key,
       List<PGPSignature> revocations,
       Map<Long, RevocationKey> revokers,
       List<String> problems)
       throws PGPException, IOException {
     for (PGPSignature revocation : revocations) {
       RevocationKey revoker = revokers.get(revocation.getKeyID());
       if (revoker == null) {
         continue; // Not a designated revoker.
       }
       byte[] rfp = revoker.getFingerprint();
       PGPPublicKeyRing revokerKeyRing = store.get(rfp);
       if (revokerKeyRing == null) {
         // Revoker is authorized and there is a revocation signature by this
         // revoker, but the key is not in the store so we can't verify the
         // signature.
         log.info(
             "Key "
                 + Fingerprint.toString(key.getFingerprint())
                 + " is revoked by "
                 + Fingerprint.toString(rfp)
                 + ", which is not in the store. Assuming revocation is valid.");
         problems.add(reasonToString(getRevocationReason(revocation)));
         continue;
       }
       PGPPublicKey rk = revokerKeyRing.getPublicKey();
       if (rk.getAlgorithm() != revoker.getAlgorithm()) {
         continue;
       }
       if (!checkBasic(rk, revocation.getCreationTime()).isOk()) {
         // Revoker's key was expired or revoked at time of revocation, so the
         // revocation is invalid.
         continue;
       }
       revocation.init(new BcPGPContentVerifierBuilderProvider(), rk);
       if (revocation.verifyCertification(key)) {
         problems.add(reasonToString(getRevocationReason(revocation)));
       }
     }
   }

   private static RevocationReason getRevocationReason(PGPSignature sig) {
     if (sig.getSignatureType() != KEY_REVOCATION) {
       throw new IllegalArgumentException(
           "Expected KEY_REVOCATION signature, got " + sig.getSignatureType());
     }
     SignatureSubpacket sub = sig.getHashedSubPackets().getSubpacket(REVOCATION_REASON);
     if (sub == null) {
       return null;
     }
     return new RevocationReason(sub.isCritical(), sub.isLongLength(), sub.getData());
   }

   private static String reasonToString(RevocationReason reason) {
     StringBuilder r = new StringBuilder("Key is revoked (");
     if (reason == null) {
       return r.append("no reason provided)").toString();
     }
     switch (reason.getRevocationReason()) {
       case NO_REASON:
         r.append("no reason code specified");
         break;
       case KEY_SUPERSEDED:
         r.append("superseded");
         break;
       case KEY_COMPROMISED:
         r.append("key material has been compromised");
         break;
       case KEY_RETIRED:
         r.append("retired and no longer valid");
         break;
       default:
         r.append("reason code ").append(Integer.toString(reason.getRevocationReason())).append(')');
         break;
     }
     r.append(')');
     String desc = reason.getRevocationDescription();
     if (!desc.isEmpty()) {
       r.append(": ").append(desc);
     }
     return r.toString();
   }

   private CheckResult checkWebOfTrust(
       PGPPublicKey key, PublicKeyStore store, int depth, Set<Fingerprint> seen) {
     if (trusted == null) {
       // Trust checking not configured, server trusts all OK keys.
       return CheckResult.trusted();
     }
     Fingerprint fp = new Fingerprint(key.getFingerprint());
     if (seen.contains(fp)) {
       return CheckResult.ok("Key is trusted in a cycle");
     }
     seen.add(fp);

     Fingerprint trustedFp = trusted.get(key.getKeyID());
     if (trustedFp != null && trustedFp.equals(fp)) {
       return CheckResult.trusted(); // Directly trusted.
     } else if (depth >= maxTrustDepth) {
       return CheckResult.ok("No path of depth <= " + maxTrustDepth + " to a trusted key");
     }

     List<CheckResult> signerResults = new ArrayList<>();
     Iterator<String> userIds = key.getUserIDs();
     while (userIds.hasNext()) {
       String userId = userIds.next();

       // Don't check the timestamp of these certifications. This allows admins
       // to correct untrusted keys by signing them with a trusted key, such that
       // older signatures created by those keys retroactively appear valid.
       Iterator<PGPSignature> sigs = key.getSignaturesForID(userId);

       while (sigs.hasNext()) {
         PGPSignature sig = sigs.next();
         // TODO(dborowitz): Handle CERTIFICATION_REVOCATION.
         if (sig.getSignatureType() != PGPSignature.DEFAULT_CERTIFICATION
             && sig.getSignatureType() != PGPSignature.POSITIVE_CERTIFICATION) {
           continue; // Not a certification.
         }

         PGPPublicKey signer = getSigner(store, sig, userId, key, signerResults);
         // TODO(dborowitz): Require self certification.
         if (signer == null || Arrays.equals(signer.getFingerprint(), key.getFingerprint())) {
           continue;
         }
         String subpacketProblem = checkTrustSubpacket(sig, depth);
         if (subpacketProblem == null) {
           CheckResult signerResult = check(signer, depth + 1, false, seen);
           if (signerResult.isTrusted()) {
             return CheckResult.trusted();
           }
         }
         signerResults.add(
             CheckResult.ok(
                 "Certification by " + keyToString(signer) + " is valid, but key is not trusted"));
       }
     }

     List<String> problems = new ArrayList<>();
     problems.add("No path to a trusted key");
     for (CheckResult signerResult : signerResults) {
       problems.addAll(signerResult.getProblems());
     }
     return CheckResult.create(OK, problems);
   }

   private static PGPPublicKey getSigner(
       PublicKeyStore store,
       PGPSignature sig,
       String userId,
       PGPPublicKey key,
       List<CheckResult> results) {
     try {
       PGPPublicKeyRingCollection signers = store.get(sig.getKeyID());
       if (!signers.getKeyRings().hasNext()) {
         results.add(
             CheckResult.ok(
                 "Key "
                     + keyIdToString(sig.getKeyID())
                     + " used for certification is not in store"));
         return null;
       }
       PGPPublicKey signer = PublicKeyStore.getSigner(signers, sig, userId, key);
       if (signer == null) {
         results.add(
             CheckResult.ok("Certification by " + keyIdToString(sig.getKeyID()) + " is not valid"));
         return null;
       }
       return signer;
     } catch (PGPException | IOException e) {
       results.add(
           CheckResult.ok("Error checking certification by " + keyIdToString(sig.getKeyID())));
       return null;
     }
   }

   private String checkTrustSubpacket(PGPSignature sig, int depth) {
     SignatureSubpacket trustSub =
         sig.getHashedSubPackets().getSubpacket(SignatureSubpacketTags.TRUST_SIG);
     if (trustSub == null || trustSub.getData().length != 2) {
       return "Certification is missing trust information";
     }
     byte amount = trustSub.getData()[1];
     if (amount < COMPLETE_TRUST) {
       return "Certification does not fully trust key";
     }
     byte level = trustSub.getData()[0];
     int required = depth + 1;
     if (level < required) {
       return "Certification trusts to depth " + level + ", but depth " + required + " is required";
     }
     return null;
   }
 }
	// Copyright (C) 2015 The Android Open Source Project
	//
	// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
	// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
	// You may obtain a copy of the License at
	//
	// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
	//
	// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
	// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
	// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
	// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
	// limitations under the License.

	package com.google.gerrit.gpg;

	import static com.google.gerrit.extensions.common.GpgKeyInfo.Status.BAD;
	import static com.google.gerrit.extensions.common.GpgKeyInfo.Status.OK;
	import static com.google.gerrit.extensions.common.GpgKeyInfo.Status.TRUSTED;
	import static com.google.gerrit.gpg.PublicKeyStore.keyIdToString;
	import static com.google.gerrit.gpg.PublicKeyStore.keyToString;
	import static org.bouncycastle.bcpg.SignatureSubpacketTags.REVOCATION_KEY;
	import static org.bouncycastle.bcpg.SignatureSubpacketTags.REVOCATION_REASON;
	import static org.bouncycastle.bcpg.sig.RevocationReasonTags.KEY_COMPROMISED;
	import static org.bouncycastle.bcpg.sig.RevocationReasonTags.KEY_RETIRED;
	import static org.bouncycastle.bcpg.sig.RevocationReasonTags.KEY_SUPERSEDED;
	import static org.bouncycastle.bcpg.sig.RevocationReasonTags.NO_REASON;
	import static org.bouncycastle.openpgp.PGPSignature.DIRECT_KEY;
	import static org.bouncycastle.openpgp.PGPSignature.KEY_REVOCATION;

	import com.google.gerrit.extensions.common.GpgKeyInfo.Status;
	import java.io.IOException;
	import java.util.ArrayList;
	import java.util.Arrays;
	import java.util.Date;
	import java.util.HashMap;
	import java.util.HashSet;
	import java.util.Iterator;
	import java.util.List;
	import java.util.Map;
	import java.util.Set;
	import org.bouncycastle.bcpg.SignatureSubpacket;
	import org.bouncycastle.bcpg.SignatureSubpacketTags;
	import org.bouncycastle.bcpg.sig.RevocationKey;
	import org.bouncycastle.bcpg.sig.RevocationReason;
	import org.bouncycastle.openpgp.PGPException;
	import org.bouncycastle.openpgp.PGPPublicKey;
	import org.bouncycastle.openpgp.PGPPublicKeyRing;
	import org.bouncycastle.openpgp.PGPPublicKeyRingCollection;
	import org.bouncycastle.openpgp.PGPSignature;
	import org.bouncycastle.openpgp.operator.bc.BcPGPContentVerifierBuilderProvider;
	import org.slf4j.Logger;
	import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;

	/** Checker for GPG public keys for use in a push certificate. */
	public class PublicKeyChecker {
	private static final Logger log = LoggerFactory.getLogger(PublicKeyChecker.class);

	// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.2.3.13
	private static final int COMPLETE_TRUST = 120;

	private PublicKeyStore store;
	private Map<Long, Fingerprint> trusted;
	private int maxTrustDepth;
	private Date effectiveTime = new Date();

	/**
	* Enable web-of-trust checks.
	*
	* <p>If enabled, a store must be set with {@link #setStore(PublicKeyStore)}. (These methods are
	* separate since the store is a closeable resource that may not be available when reading trusted
	* keys from a config.)
	*
	* @param maxTrustDepth maximum depth to search while looking for a trusted key.
	* @param trusted ultimately trusted key fingerprints, keyed by fingerprint; may not be empty. To
	* construct a map, see {@link Fingerprint#byId(Iterable)}.
	* @return a reference to this object.
	*/
	public PublicKeyChecker enableTrust(int maxTrustDepth, Map<Long, Fingerprint> trusted) {
	if (maxTrustDepth <= 0) {
	throw new IllegalArgumentException("maxTrustDepth must be positive, got: " + maxTrustDepth);
	}
	if (trusted == null \|\| trusted.isEmpty()) {
	throw new IllegalArgumentException("at least one trusted key is required");
	}
	this.maxTrustDepth = maxTrustDepth;
	this.trusted = trusted;
	return this;
	}

	/** Disable web-of-trust checks. */
	public PublicKeyChecker disableTrust() {
	trusted = null;
	return this;
	}

	/** Set the public key store for reading keys referenced in signatures. */
	public PublicKeyChecker setStore(PublicKeyStore store) {
	if (store == null) {
	throw new IllegalArgumentException("PublicKeyStore is required");
	}
	this.store = store;
	return this;
	}

	/**
	* Set the effective time for checking the key.
	*
	* <p>If set, check whether the key should be considered valid (e.g. unexpired) as of this time.
	*
	* @param effectiveTime effective time.
	* @return a reference to this object.
	*/
	public PublicKeyChecker setEffectiveTime(Date effectiveTime) {
	this.effectiveTime = effectiveTime;
	return this;
	}

	protected Date getEffectiveTime() {
	return effectiveTime;
	}

	/**
	* Check a public key.
	*
	* @param key the public key.
	* @return the result of the check.
	*/
	public final CheckResult check(PGPPublicKey key) {
	if (store == null) {
	throw new IllegalStateException("PublicKeyStore is required");
	}
	return check(key, 0, true, trusted != null ? new HashSet<Fingerprint>() : null);
	}

	/**
	* Perform custom checks.
	*
	* <p>Default implementation reports no problems, but may be overridden by subclasses.
	*
	* @param key the public key.
	* @param depth the depth from the initial key passed to {@link #check( PGPPublicKey)}: 0 if this
	* was the initial key, up to a maximum of {@code maxTrustDepth}.
	* @return the result of the custom check.
	*/
	public CheckResult checkCustom(PGPPublicKey key, int depth) {
	return CheckResult.ok();
	}

	private CheckResult check(PGPPublicKey key, int depth, boolean expand, Set<Fingerprint> seen) {
	CheckResult basicResult = checkBasic(key, effectiveTime);
	CheckResult customResult = checkCustom(key, depth);
	CheckResult trustResult = checkWebOfTrust(key, store, depth, seen);
	if (!expand && !trustResult.isTrusted()) {
	trustResult = CheckResult.create(trustResult.getStatus(), "Key is not trusted");
	}

	List<String> problems =
	new ArrayList<>(
	basicResult.getProblems().size()
	+ customResult.getProblems().size()
	+ trustResult.getProblems().size());
	problems.addAll(basicResult.getProblems());
	problems.addAll(customResult.getProblems());
	problems.addAll(trustResult.getProblems());

	Status status;
	if (basicResult.getStatus() == BAD
	\|\| customResult.getStatus() == BAD
	\|\| trustResult.getStatus() == BAD) {
	// Any BAD result and the final result is BAD.
	status = BAD;
	} else if (trustResult.getStatus() == TRUSTED) {
	// basicResult is BAD or OK, whereas trustResult is BAD or TRUSTED. If
	// TRUSTED, we trust the final result.
	status = TRUSTED;
	} else {
	// All results were OK or better, but trustResult was not TRUSTED. Don't
	// let subclasses bypass checkWebOfTrust by returning TRUSTED; just return
	// OK here.
	status = OK;
	}
	return CheckResult.create(status, problems);
	}

	private CheckResult checkBasic(PGPPublicKey key, Date now) {
	List<String> problems = new ArrayList<>(2);
	gatherRevocationProblems(key, now, problems);

	long validMs = key.getValidSeconds() * 1000;
	if (validMs != 0) {
	long msSinceCreation = now.getTime() - key.getCreationTime().getTime();
	if (msSinceCreation > validMs) {
	problems.add("Key is expired");
	}
	}
	return CheckResult.create(problems);
	}

	private void gatherRevocationProblems(PGPPublicKey key, Date now, List<String> problems) {
	try {
	List<PGPSignature> revocations = new ArrayList<>();
	Map<Long, RevocationKey> revokers = new HashMap<>();
	PGPSignature selfRevocation = scanRevocations(key, now, revocations, revokers);
	if (selfRevocation != null) {
	RevocationReason reason = getRevocationReason(selfRevocation);
	if (isRevocationValid(selfRevocation, reason, now)) {
	problems.add(reasonToString(reason));
	}
	} else {
	checkRevocations(key, revocations, revokers, problems);
	}
	} catch (PGPException \| IOException e) {
	problems.add("Error checking key revocation");
	}
	}

	private static boolean isRevocationValid(
	PGPSignature revocation, RevocationReason reason, Date now) {
	// RFC4880 states:
	// "If a key has been revoked because of a compromise, all signatures
	// created by that key are suspect. However, if it was merely superseded or
	// retired, old signatures are still valid."
	//
	// Note that GnuPG does not implement this correctly, as it does not
	// consider the revocation reason and timestamp when checking whether a
	// signature (data or certification) is valid.
	return reason.getRevocationReason() == KEY_COMPROMISED
	\|\| revocation.getCreationTime().before(now);
	}

	private PGPSignature scanRevocations(
	PGPPublicKey key, Date now, List<PGPSignature> revocations, Map<Long, RevocationKey> revokers)
	throws PGPException {
	@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
	Iterator<PGPSignature> allSigs = key.getSignatures();
	while (allSigs.hasNext()) {
	PGPSignature sig = allSigs.next();
	switch (sig.getSignatureType()) {
	case KEY_REVOCATION:
	if (sig.getKeyID() == key.getKeyID()) {
	sig.init(new BcPGPContentVerifierBuilderProvider(), key);
	if (sig.verifyCertification(key)) {
	return sig;
	}
	} else {
	RevocationReason reason = getRevocationReason(sig);
	if (reason != null && isRevocationValid(sig, reason, now)) {
	revocations.add(sig);
	}
	}
	break;
	case DIRECT_KEY:
	RevocationKey r = getRevocationKey(key, sig);
	if (r != null) {
	revokers.put(Fingerprint.getId(r.getFingerprint()), r);
	}
	break;
	}
	}
	return null;
	}

	private RevocationKey getRevocationKey(PGPPublicKey key, PGPSignature sig) throws PGPException {
	if (sig.getKeyID() != key.getKeyID()) {
	return null;
	}
	SignatureSubpacket sub = sig.getHashedSubPackets().getSubpacket(REVOCATION_KEY);
	if (sub == null) {
	return null;
	}
	sig.init(new BcPGPContentVerifierBuilderProvider(), key);
	if (!sig.verifyCertification(key)) {
	return null;
	}

	return new RevocationKey(sub.isCritical(), sub.isLongLength(), sub.getData());
	}

	private void checkRevocations(
	PGPPublicKey key,
	List<PGPSignature> revocations,
	Map<Long, RevocationKey> revokers,
	List<String> problems)
	throws PGPException, IOException {
	for (PGPSignature revocation : revocations) {
	RevocationKey revoker = revokers.get(revocation.getKeyID());
	if (revoker == null) {
	continue; // Not a designated revoker.
	}
	byte[] rfp = revoker.getFingerprint();
	PGPPublicKeyRing revokerKeyRing = store.get(rfp);
	if (revokerKeyRing == null) {
	// Revoker is authorized and there is a revocation signature by this
	// revoker, but the key is not in the store so we can't verify the
	// signature.
	log.info(
	"Key "
	+ Fingerprint.toString(key.getFingerprint())
	+ " is revoked by "
	+ Fingerprint.toString(rfp)
	+ ", which is not in the store. Assuming revocation is valid.");
	problems.add(reasonToString(getRevocationReason(revocation)));
	continue;
	}
	PGPPublicKey rk = revokerKeyRing.getPublicKey();
	if (rk.getAlgorithm() != revoker.getAlgorithm()) {
	continue;
	}
	if (!checkBasic(rk, revocation.getCreationTime()).isOk()) {
	// Revoker's key was expired or revoked at time of revocation, so the
	// revocation is invalid.
	continue;
	}
	revocation.init(new BcPGPContentVerifierBuilderProvider(), rk);
	if (revocation.verifyCertification(key)) {
	problems.add(reasonToString(getRevocationReason(revocation)));
	}
	}
	}

	private static RevocationReason getRevocationReason(PGPSignature sig) {
	if (sig.getSignatureType() != KEY_REVOCATION) {
	throw new IllegalArgumentException(
	"Expected KEY_REVOCATION signature, got " + sig.getSignatureType());
	}
	SignatureSubpacket sub = sig.getHashedSubPackets().getSubpacket(REVOCATION_REASON);
	if (sub == null) {
	return null;
	}
	return new RevocationReason(sub.isCritical(), sub.isLongLength(), sub.getData());
	}

	private static String reasonToString(RevocationReason reason) {
	StringBuilder r = new StringBuilder("Key is revoked (");
	if (reason == null) {
	return r.append("no reason provided)").toString();
	}
	switch (reason.getRevocationReason()) {
	case NO_REASON:
	r.append("no reason code specified");
	break;
	case KEY_SUPERSEDED:
	r.append("superseded");
	break;
	case KEY_COMPROMISED:
	r.append("key material has been compromised");
	break;
	case KEY_RETIRED:
	r.append("retired and no longer valid");
	break;
	default:
	r.append("reason code ").append(Integer.toString(reason.getRevocationReason())).append(')');
	break;
	}
	r.append(')');
	String desc = reason.getRevocationDescription();
	if (!desc.isEmpty()) {
	r.append(": ").append(desc);
	}
	return r.toString();
	}

	private CheckResult checkWebOfTrust(
	PGPPublicKey key, PublicKeyStore store, int depth, Set<Fingerprint> seen) {
	if (trusted == null) {
	// Trust checking not configured, server trusts all OK keys.
	return CheckResult.trusted();
	}
	Fingerprint fp = new Fingerprint(key.getFingerprint());
	if (seen.contains(fp)) {
	return CheckResult.ok("Key is trusted in a cycle");
	}
	seen.add(fp);

	Fingerprint trustedFp = trusted.get(key.getKeyID());
	if (trustedFp != null && trustedFp.equals(fp)) {
	return CheckResult.trusted(); // Directly trusted.
	} else if (depth >= maxTrustDepth) {
	return CheckResult.ok("No path of depth <= " + maxTrustDepth + " to a trusted key");
	}

	List<CheckResult> signerResults = new ArrayList<>();
	Iterator<String> userIds = key.getUserIDs();
	while (userIds.hasNext()) {
	String userId = userIds.next();

	// Don't check the timestamp of these certifications. This allows admins
	// to correct untrusted keys by signing them with a trusted key, such that
	// older signatures created by those keys retroactively appear valid.
	Iterator<PGPSignature> sigs = key.getSignaturesForID(userId);

	while (sigs.hasNext()) {
	PGPSignature sig = sigs.next();
	// TODO(dborowitz): Handle CERTIFICATION_REVOCATION.
	if (sig.getSignatureType() != PGPSignature.DEFAULT_CERTIFICATION
	&& sig.getSignatureType() != PGPSignature.POSITIVE_CERTIFICATION) {
	continue; // Not a certification.
	}

	PGPPublicKey signer = getSigner(store, sig, userId, key, signerResults);
	// TODO(dborowitz): Require self certification.
	if (signer == null \|\| Arrays.equals(signer.getFingerprint(), key.getFingerprint())) {
	continue;
	}
	String subpacketProblem = checkTrustSubpacket(sig, depth);
	if (subpacketProblem == null) {
	CheckResult signerResult = check(signer, depth + 1, false, seen);
	if (signerResult.isTrusted()) {
	return CheckResult.trusted();
	}
	}
	signerResults.add(
	CheckResult.ok(
	"Certification by " + keyToString(signer) + " is valid, but key is not trusted"));
	}
	}

	List<String> problems = new ArrayList<>();
	problems.add("No path to a trusted key");
	for (CheckResult signerResult : signerResults) {
	problems.addAll(signerResult.getProblems());
	}
	return CheckResult.create(OK, problems);
	}

	private static PGPPublicKey getSigner(
	PublicKeyStore store,
	PGPSignature sig,
	String userId,
	PGPPublicKey key,
	List<CheckResult> results) {
	try {
	PGPPublicKeyRingCollection signers = store.get(sig.getKeyID());
	if (!signers.getKeyRings().hasNext()) {
	results.add(
	CheckResult.ok(
	"Key "
	+ keyIdToString(sig.getKeyID())
	+ " used for certification is not in store"));
	return null;
	}
	PGPPublicKey signer = PublicKeyStore.getSigner(signers, sig, userId, key);
	if (signer == null) {
	results.add(
	CheckResult.ok("Certification by " + keyIdToString(sig.getKeyID()) + " is not valid"));
	return null;
	}
	return signer;
	} catch (PGPException \| IOException e) {
	results.add(
	CheckResult.ok("Error checking certification by " + keyIdToString(sig.getKeyID())));
	return null;
	}
	}

	private String checkTrustSubpacket(PGPSignature sig, int depth) {
	SignatureSubpacket trustSub =
	sig.getHashedSubPackets().getSubpacket(SignatureSubpacketTags.TRUST_SIG);
	if (trustSub == null \|\| trustSub.getData().length != 2) {
	return "Certification is missing trust information";
	}
	byte amount = trustSub.getData()[1];
	if (amount < COMPLETE_TRUST) {
	return "Certification does not fully trust key";
	}
	byte level = trustSub.getData()[0];
	int required = depth + 1;
	if (level < required) {
	return "Certification trusts to depth " + level + ", but depth " + required + " is required";
	}
	return null;
	}
	}